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The Lottery1 is a short story that describes a fictional, bucolic small
town in the United States. The townspeople seem lovely and perhaps
even thoughtful about each other, until once per year when their cleansing happens. This is when they stone a member of their community to
death. The decision as to who is stoned is rather arbitrary—not based on
crime, harm to another, past misdeeds, current troubles or threats of future harm. No. It is the random black dot on a piece of paper that seals
Tessie Hutchinson’s fate.
No part of the lottery should make sense, even though the townspeople at an earlier time believed that stoning a member of their community each year would contribute to a strong harvest. Surely at some
point the illogic of this should slip away. Even if killing a mother, son, or
daughter brings a strong corn crop, is the corn yield worth it? Apparently,
they think so.
As Shirley Jackson writes, “[t]he people had done it so many times
that they only half listened to the directions; most of them were quiet,
wetting their lips, not looking around.”2 Everyone participates, even the
small children—one child, “little Davy Hutchinson” is given a few pebbles. Barely aware of life itself, the little boy will become complicit in a
practice laid out before him. He too will take part in the process that
ends in his mother’s death. He, like the town’s other children, are predestined to believe the lottery is the natural order of things.
The child will learn to smell the stench of fear in the air, taste the
anxious sweat that drips from his brow onto his lip as he one day will
choose a stone. This will become familiar. Selecting the scapegoat on
which to direct his anger, fear, and hope will be normal. This is the social
order. The lottery does not simply choose its victims. It predestines the
entitled. It protects this way of life.
*****
During the spring and summer of 2020, as COVID-19 rapidly
spread throughout the United States, infecting and killing thousands of

1. Shirley Jackson, The Lottery, NEW YORKER (June 18, 1948), https://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/1948/06/26/the-lottery [https://perma.cc/8QGT-N4FU].
2. Id.
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Americans, including children, the enduring color line manifested. As of
this publication, more than 500,000 Americans have died due to the virus. Those disproportionately harmed in the U.S. have been Indigenous,
Black, and Latinx communities. 4 Even while pundits claimed children
were safe from the virus, Black and Latinx children suffered and died
horrific deaths. 5 The patterns of implicit and explicit racism in medical
care combined with social determinants in health meant not even the
children’s youth nor institutions of public health could save them.6 Their
deaths served as stark reminders of lingering vulnerability and invisibility.
3. See Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Defeated America, ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-american-failure
/614191/ (discussing that “few countries have been as severely hit as the United States,
which has just 4 percent of the world’s population but a quarter of its confirmed
COVID-19 cases and deaths”); AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS & CHILDREN’S HOSP. ASS’N,
CHILDREN AND COVID-19: STATE-LEVEL DATA REPORT (May 10, 2021),
https://services.aap.org/en/pages/2019-novel-coronavirus-covid-19-infections/childrenand-covid-19-state-level-data-report/ [https://perma.cc/3YJ5-K9FK] (finding “3,854,791
total child COVID-19 cases reported, and children represented 14% . . . of all cases . . . .
Children were 0.00%-0.21% of all COVID-19 deaths” and “[i]n states reporting, 0.00%0.03% of all child COVID-19 cases resulted in death.”).
4. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HEALTH EQUITY
CONSIDERATIONS AND RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS (last updated Apr. 19,
2021) , https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnicminorities.html [https://perma.cc/8B7G-MBUS] (finding that racial and ethnic minority
populations are disproportionately represented among essential workers and are, accordingly, disproportionately affected by COVID-19).
5. See, e.g., William Wan, Coronavirus Kills Far More Hispanic and Black Children than
White Youths, CDC Study Finds, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/09/15/covid-deaths-hispanic-black-children/
[https://perma.cc/497Z-T3XR] (“Of the children and teens killed, 45 percent were Hispanic, 29 Black and 4 percent American Indian.”); Gabrielle Chung, Florida’s Youngest
Coronavirus Victim Identified as 9-year-old Kimora “Kimmie” Lynum, PEOPLE (July 27, 2020
6:42 PM), https://people.com/health/florida-youngest-coronavirus-victim-identified-as9-year-old-girl-with-kimora-kimmie-lynum-no-preexisting-health-issues/ [https://perma.cc/
EED2-8JRY] (“Kimora ‘Kimmie’ Lynum[, a nine-year-old African American girl,] passed
away from coronavirus complications after she went down for a nap on July 17.” She
went to the hospital feeling ill and with a 103 fever, but was never tested for coronavirus
until after her death.); Jasmin Barmore, 5-year-old with Rare Complication Becomes First
Michigan Child to Die of COVID-19, DETROIT NEWS (Apr. 20, 2020 7:45 PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2020/04/19/5-year-oldfirst-michigan-child-dies-coronavirus/5163094002 [https://perma.cc/DP58-75RZ] (Skylar Herbert, a five-year-old African American girl, “tested positive for COVID-19 in
March and later developed a rare form of meningitis and brain swelling.” She passed away
in April “after spending two weeks on a ventilator.”).
6. See Wan, supra note 5 (highlighting “underlying social disparities that minority
children are more likely to experience than their White peers: crowded living conditions,
food and housing insecurity, parents who are essential workers and cannot work from
home, wealth and education gaps and difficulty accessing health care because of a lack of
family resources including insurance, child care, transportation or sick leave”).

264

Michigan Journal of Race & Law

[VOL. 26:2

Taking seriously that COVID-19 has exposed preexisting institutional
and infrastructural vulnerabilities and inequality in the United States, 7 this
Article turns to what stratifies and divides the nation.
That is, in 2020, it also became unquestionably apparent that the
pandemic was not all that ails the United States. Systemic racism, white
supremacy, and anti-Blackness crystallized in the murders of Ahmaud
Aubrey, an unarmed jogger, stalked and killed by Gregory and Travis
McMichael in a rural Georgia town; 8 Breonna Taylor, an essential
healthcare provider, fatally shot by several Louisville, Kentucky police officers; 9 and George Floyd, lynched in broad daylight as a Minneapolis,
Minnesota officer straddled his neck, pressing a knee onto it for over nine
minutes as crowds gasped and watched in horror. 10 Weeks later, Jacob
7. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 4 (explaining that
“discrimination exists in systems meant to protect well-being or health. . . . Discrimination, which includes racism, can lead to chronic and toxic stress and shapes social and
economic factors that put some people from racial and ethnic minority groups at increased risk for COVID-19.”).
8. See Richard Fausset, What We Know About the Shooting Death of Ahmaud Arbery,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arbery-shootinggeorgia.html [https://perma.cc/XE3V-JWJP] (“On Sunday, Feb. 23, shortly after 1 p.m.,
[Mr. Arbery] was killed in a neighborhood a short jog from his home after being confronted by a white man and his son.”).
9. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Derrick Bryson Taylor, Here’s What You Need to Know
About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com
/article/breonna-taylor-police.html [https://perma.cc/9JNR-WWZV] (reporting “[t]he
death of Breonna Taylor, a Black medical worker who was shot and killed by Louisville
police officers in March during a botched raid on her apartment”).
10. Death by lynching conveys the historic violence connected to anti-Blackness.
Some lynchings were in trees, some on poles, some off of bridges, and in Emmet Till’s
case with a cotton gin tied around his neck, and tossed in the Tallahatchie River. Some
were carried out by law enforcement and many involved private citizens. Some were
conducted by mobs, while others were facilitated by individuals. Some were in cities and
others in rural pastures. Some related to purported crimes and many did not. Emmet Till
was lynched for a supposed whistle at a white woman. Of the lynched, some were women, some were men. Some were children. And even some were toddlers.
The terror and trauma associated with the killing, described in the media as the asphyxiation, included Mr. Floyd calling for his mother and pleading that he could not
breathe. For my research on Mr. Floyd’s murder, I interviewed Dr. George Woods, the
past president of the International Academy of Law and Mental Health who emphasized
that what occurred to Mr. Floyd was in fact a lynching. He described the important elements of a lynching, including its purposeful or otherwise infliction of terror on Black
Americans. Lynchings were not only acts of aggression against individuals, but they were
also acts that conveyed threats and intimidation to other Black people who might “forget
their place” or “step out of line.” In this case, Dr. Woods, and other Black thoughtleaders have drawn parallels that may not be exact to the 1920s and 1930s, but are adjusted to the times in which we live. The act was public, violent, and did traumatize Black
people around the country and world. See e.g., WITHOUT SANCTUARY,
https://withoutsanctuary.org/[ https://perma.cc/4DT5-4V6F]; Equal Justice Initiative,

WINTER 2021]

Law and Anti-Blackness

265

Blake, an unarmed father, would be shot seven times at close range while
his children watched, in Kenosha, Wisconsin.11
What exactly do these fractures reveal about society and law in the
United States? Is there a descriptive story to tell with a normative analog?
If so, what can we learn from it? Are there lessons for the present to be
derived from attention to this past? Has the strange promise of a postracial United States materialized after the two-term presidency of its first
Black president, Barack Obama?
The fractures to which this Article speaks were brought into stark
relief in 2020. They revealed unaddressed racial trauma; an American history mired in the terrorism of Black people, spanning slavery and postreconstruction; and ultimately centuries of unhealed wounds. 12 2020
brought about an aggressive pandemic marked by an increasing death toll
month by month from COVID-19. 13 2020 also marked the untimely

Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror (3d Edition, 2017), https://eji.org
/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/lynching-in-america-3d-ed-091620.pdf [https://perma.cc
/B58V-UWNS]; see also, Evan Hill et. al, How George Floyd Was Killed In Police Custody,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floydinvestigation.html [https://perma.cc/2QST-PXMJ] (“On May 25, Minneapolis police
officers arrested George Floyd . . . . Seventeen minutes after the first squad car arrived at
the scene, Mr. Floyd was unconscious and pinned beneath three police officers, showing
no signs of life.”).
11. See Christina Morales, What We Know About the Shooting of Jacob Blake, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/jacob-blake-shooting-kenosha.html
[https://perma.cc/9AQ8-52PN] (“Jacob Blake, a 29-year-old Black man, was left partly
paralyzed after a white police officer shot him seven times in the back outside an apartment complex in Kenosha, Wis., on Aug. 23 . . . in front of three of Mr. Blake’s children.”).
12. See, e.g., Lillian Comas-Díaz, Gordon Nagayama Hall, & Helen A. Neville, Racial
Trauma: Theory, Research, and Healing: Introduction to the Special Issue, 74 AM. PSYCHOL. 1,
1 (2019), https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2019-01033-001.pdf [https://perma.cc/EXT7WGYT] (explaining that “[r]acism and ethnoviolence can be life threatening to [People
of Color and Indigenous individuals], due to their exposure to racial microaggressions,
vicarious trauma-tization, and the invisibility of racial trauma’s historical roots. Cumulative racial trauma can leave scars for those who are dehumanized”); Alia E. Dastagir,
George Floyd Video Adds to Trauma: ‘When is the Last Time You Saw a White Person Killed
Online?’, USA TODAY (May 29, 2020, 6:40 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation/2020/05/28/george-floyd-ahmaud-arbery-covid-emotional-toll-hits-blackfamilies/5270216002/ [https://perma.cc/GWG4-ZVPX] (quoting Alisha MorelandCapuia, executive director of Oregon Health & Science University’s Avel Gordly Center
for Healing: “The persistent pandemic is racism. That’s the pandemic. Recent deaths of
individuals of color and the deleterious impact of COVID-19 on communities of color
stems all the way from 1776.”).
13. See Joe Murphy & Corky Siemaszko, U.S. Surpasses 250,000 Coronavirus Deaths as
Virus Mortality Rate Surges, NBC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2020, 3:26 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/u-s-surpasses-250-000-coronavirus-deaths-virus-mortality-rate-n1248109
[https://perma.cc/JXV4-BCDD].
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death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and political turmoil leading up
to the general election. 15 Until the end, the year unfolded with chaos and
consternation, including the challenge of the presidential election results,
namely by former President Donald Trump, who claimed on social media, 16 in the news, and through more than sixty lawsuits that fraud mired
the 2020 presidential election and that he rightfully had won. 17 By January 2021, the Washington Post reported that the president made a total of
30,573 false or misleading claims over four years, including “503 false or
misleading claims as he barnstormed across the country in a desperate effort to win reelection.” 18
2020 revealed strife and racial tensions that manifested in protest in
the United States, yet it also beckoned for truth, reckoning, and reconciliation. The strange confluence of events in 2020 urges the acknowledgment of an origin story that places slavery, Jim Crow, and contemporary
white supremacy, nationalism, and racism in proper discussion and con-

14. See Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of Gender Equality, Dies
At 87, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/18
/100306972/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-champion-of-gender-equality-dies-at-87 [https:/
/perma.cc/BY4H-HEZD].
15. See, e.g., Quint Forgey, Zach Montellaro, & Caitlin Oprysko, Trump Refuses to
Back Down on Suggestion of Election Delay, POLITICO (July 30, 2020, 7:27 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/30/trump-suggests-delaying-2020-election387902 [https://perma.cc/67XU-LPK7] (reporting that “President Donald Trump . . .
refused to back down from his suggestion earlier in the day that the November general
election be postponed, repeating unsubstantiated predictions of widespread voter fraud
amid the coronavirus pandemic”).
16. Daniel Dale, Fact Checking Trump’s Barrage of Lies Over the Weekend, CNN (Nov.
16, 2020, 6:16 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/16/politics/fact-check-trumprigged-election-dominion-georgia-pennsylvania/index.html
[https://perma.cc/WCR7G9YY] (“‘I WON THE ELECTION!’ President Donald Trump tweeted just before
midnight on Sunday night. Trump did not win the election. So this was a fitting conclusion to his lie-filled weekend barrage of tweets, in which he continued to invent imaginary evidence in support of his attempt to deny Joe Biden’s victory.”); Amanda Seitz,
David Klepper, & Barbara Ortutay, False Claims of Voting Fraud, Pushed by Trump, Thrive
Online, AP NEWS (Nov. 10, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-bidendonald-trump-politics-media-1bf96bf3910bdcbe0f125958357c8f1a [https://perma.cc
/4YAS-2GUM] (noting that “Trump . . . has continued his assault on the U.S. vote in
more than 40 Facebook and Twitter posts since Election Day”).
17. See generally Jake Horton, US Election 2020: What Legal Challenges Remain for
Trump?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-202054724960 [https://perma.cc/MJ93-JHBJ] (explaining, for example, that “[i]n Georgia, an
attempt was made to stop the count in Chatham County, alleging problems with ballot
processing - but the lawsuit was rejected by a judge who said there was ‘no evidence’ of
improper ballot mixing.”).
18. Glenn Kessler, Salvador Rizzo, & Meg Kelly, Trump’s False of Misleading Claims
Total 30,573 over 4 Years, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/2021/01/24/trumps-false-or-misleading-claims-total-30573-over-four-years/.

WINTER 2021]

Law and Anti-Blackness

267

texts alongside the more popular, traditional American narratives that
center revolutionary spirit of white Americans who fought against the
British to stake a claim for their equality and dignity. 19 Long divorced
from that historical, political, and legal discourse is acknowledgment of
the purposeful and enduring harms cast upon Indigenous peoples and
Black Americans to justify colonialism, the capitalism derived by slavery,
and the post-Reconstruction era scapegoating of the newly “freed.”20 In
other words, there are racialized traumas and terrorism yet to be fully accounted for in the stories we tell ourselves.
For example, from a historical perspective, what message must people tell themselves to justify the intergenerational kidnapping and trafficking of children, women, and men across international borders and
throughout the United States? How does a society come to tolerate children on the auction block, bid upon as if they were field chattels? What
narratives must the auctioneers tell to encourage bidders and secure lucrative offers for the traders in human flesh? How do individuals come to
justify their participation in the cruel enterprise, including enslaving,
renting, leasing, and selling their own offspring, born from frequent
though unacknowledged debasement of enslaved women?
How has the failure to acknowledge and address the carnage and
prurience of America’s racial origin story impacted life today? What social
conditioning made possible the separate and unequal society of the 20th
century? A nation marked by white Christians bombing Black Christian
churches and the homes of Black ministers and clergy? What lives in the
soul of a nation to justify school segregation? Housing segregation? Voter
suppression?
The heavy iron shackles that controlled the movements of enslaved
Blacks were replaced in “freedom” by invisible chains and restraints that
demarcated social and legal hierarchies protected by law. Today, what
makes possible a police officer’s strangulation of an unarmed Black man,
while colleagues look on? In short, one hundred and fifty years after the
19. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, How the American Revolution Worked Against Blacks, Indians, and Women, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11
/books/review/alan-taylor-american-revolutions.html
[https://perma.cc/P5EN-5SBN]
(reviewing American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804 by Alan Taylor: “he
aims to desacralize the Revolution, to explode popular myths about it and to rip aside the
mantle of nobility, dignity and heroism that he believes has too long covered up its sordid
and bloody reality. . . . Southerners . . . engaged in the Revolution principally to protect
their property in enslaved Africans”).
20. See, e.g., CalvinJohn Smiley & David Fakunle, From “Brute” to “Thug:” the Demonization and Criminalization of Unarmed Black Male Victims in America, 26 J. HUM. BEHAV.
SOC. ENV’T 350, 353-54 (2016), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles
/PMC5004736/ [ https://perma.cc/58B2-MXWE] (writing that “[t]he criminalization of
Blackness allowed for White supremacy to use Black bodies as their scapegoat for all
problems, real or fictional”).
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ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the third and final of the Reconstruction Amendments, 21 the stain and vestiges of slavery in the United States remain.
This Article addresses a thin slice of the American stain. Its value
derives from the conversation it attempts to foster related to reckoning,
reconciliation, and redemption. As the 1930s Federal Writers’ Project attempted to illuminate and make sense of slavery through its Born in Slavery: Slave Narratives From 1936-1938, so too this project seeks to uncover
and name law’s role in fomenting racial division and caste. Part I turns to
pathos and hate, creating race and otherness through legislating reproduction—literal and figurative. Part II turns to the Thirteenth Amendment.
It argues that the preservation of slavery endured through its transformation. That the amendment makes no room for equality further establishes the racial caste system. Part III then examines the making of racial
division and caste through state legislation and local ordinances, exposing
the sophistry of separate but equal. Part IV turns to the effects of these laws
and how they shaped cultural norms. As demonstrated in Parts I-IV, the
racial divide and caste system traumatizes its victims, while also undermining the promise of constitutional equality, civil liberties, and civil
rights.
Part I: Pathos and Hate: Creating Race and Otherness
In 1903, W.E.B. DuBois published The Souls of Black Folks, recounting that the notion of freedom for Black people “was simply unthinkable, the maddest of experiments,”22 because Black people were
classed as “man and ox together.” 23 As part of the Southern strategy,
white men “fought with desperate energy to perpetuate this slavery under which the black masses . . . had writhed and shivered.” 24 The Northern allies proved complicated, according to DuBois, as they stood to use
newly freed Black people as “a club for driving the recalcitrant South

21. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 360 (1870) (explaining that the Reconstruction
Amendments, “were primarily designed to give freedom to persons of the African race,
prevent their future enslavement, make them citizens, prevent discriminating State legislation against their rights as freemen, and secure to them the ballot. The generality of the
language used necessarily extends some of their provisions to all persons of every race and
color; but in construing the amendments and giving effect to them, the occasion of their
adoption and the purposes they were designed to attain should be always borne in
mind.”).
22. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 28 (5th ed. 1904).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 28-29.
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back into loyalty.” DuBois presciently predicted over a century ago that
the problems of the United States would be the color line. That is, the
struggle with its white supremacy, desperate cleave to racial hierarchy,
and inability to rid itself of caste.
In 1855, a decade prior to the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification,
Frederick Douglass, known as one of the nation’s leading abolitionists
and an escapee from the bondages of slavery himself, wrote, “Not only is
26
slavery on trial, but unfortunately, the enslaved people are also on trial.”
He explained, “It is alleged, that they are, naturally, inferior; that they
are so low in the scale of humanity, and so utterly stupid, that they are unconscious of their wrongs, and do not apprehend their rights.”27 This
American racial color line established the boundaries of citizenship and
naturalization.
Placed in its proper context, the American commitment—perhaps
addiction—to its racial ideology of a caste system 28 should be understood
as an uninterrupted continuum since the earliest European and later U.S.
ships arrived on the North American shores, carrying cargo of kidnapped
and trafficked Africans. Isabel Wilkerson now adds to this canon of
thought on the American caste system in Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents, contributing in popular form to the academic and scholarly accounts race, caste, and enduring hierarchy and white supremacy in the
United States. 29
Racial hierarchy has long been the euphemistic elephant in the
room and the American dividing line, demarking power, freedom, and
self-governance. To properly undertake the examination of racial caste in
the United States requires engaging beyond law, reaching to the fields
and tools of sociology, ethnography, and anthropology to unpack not only law’s racial trap undisguised by legislation such as Fugitive Slave Acts
or myriad cases, but also the lasting—even haunting—social, cultural, and
rhetorical norms and mores.
Essential to any caste is the establishment of a rank and order among
the people stratified. In the United States, this took the form of establishing white supremacy through law, whereby whiteness accorded privileges
and rights not available to Black people, most apparently, but far from

25. Id. at 29; see also W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN
ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE
ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1860−1880, 128-81 (1956).
26. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM vii (Celine Noel &
Wanda Gunther eds., Univ. N.C. at Chapel Hill electronic ed., 2001) (1855).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. See, e.g., ISABEL WILKERSON, CASTE: THE ORIGINS OF OUR DISCONTENTS 11517 (2020) (discussing purity versus pollution).
29. Id.
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exclusively, freedom and citizenship. In several distinct ways, law served
a vital purpose in creating racial caste and hierarchy. Law undergirded
and legalized the lucrative enterprise of American chattel slavery. That is,
laws in the United States set the conditions that kidnapped and trafficked
human chattel from Africa would never or rarely rise above their legally
designated, subordinate status.
First, matrilineality designated that all children born of enslaved
women would by law inherit the status of their mothers. This proved
important in denying the multiracial offspring of white plantation owners
independence and freedom. Second, rules of hypodescent mandated that
anyone with any African biological heritage would always be legally designated as Black, and therefore legally inferior. Later, a third legal provision would provide another guardrail against the infiltration of whiteness
and the preserving of the racial order through marriage—namely antimiscegenation laws. Finally, a fourth, twentieth century legal movement—eugenics—would protect the racial caste system from white people unfit for whiteness.
A. Matrilineality
First, given widespread sexual predation against enslaved Black
women, 31 the initial laws creating the racial caste system related to matrilineality. Sexual violence against Black women and girls was rampant in
slaveholding families, even if rendered invisible by historians. However,
researchers of human genetics offer a sobering account. Rapes against
Black women by white men were so common in the United States that
white men “contributed three times more to the modern-day gene pool
of people of African descent than European women did.”32
Thus, establishing whether the offspring of a white man and enslaved Black woman was free or enslaved was a matter of political urgency and importance—not only as it related to slavery, but also to racial
caste. Early American law provided unmistakable clarity. In 1662, the
Virginia Grand Assembly enacted one of its first “slave laws” to settle this
point. Lawmakers wrote, “Whereas some doubts have arisen whether

30. See Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and
Mass Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 929–33 (2019).
31. Steven J. Micheletti, Kasia Bryc, Samantha G. Ancona Esselmann, William A.
Freyman, Meghan E. Moreno, G. David Poznik, Anjali J. Shastri, 23andMe Research
Team, Sandra Beleza & Joanna L. Mountain, Genetic Consequences of the Transatlantic Slave
Trade in the Americas, 107 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 265, 266-73 (2020).
32. Christine Kenneally, Large DNA Study Traces Violent History of American Slavery,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/science/23andmeafrican-ancestry.html [https://perma.cc/Z9LR-BX4A].
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children got by any Englishman upon a Negro woman should be slave or
free, be it therefore enacted and declared by this present Grand Assembly, that all children born in this country shall be held bond or free only
according to the condition of the mother.”33
As defined, matrilineality served multiple purposes. It shielded white
men from legal and financial obligations to their Black offspring. Such
laws meant that Black children of white fathers could never establish paternity, freedom, citizenship, and inheritance rights. Such laws exploited
Black women’s sexual vulnerability to the predations of white men. Slavery perversely incentivized white male slaveholders’ sexual assaults on
their enslaved property as Black women lacked rights and could not lay
claim to their offspring nor spare them from enslavement. Black women
and their offspring were all considered the property of the persons who
“owned” them. 34
B. Hypodescent
The second means of ordering America’s racial caste system was its
establishment of hypodescent through the race-delineating “one drop”
rule. Such laws mandated that any African ancestry defined a person as
“negro” or “colored” (each of these terms signifying those who would
today be referred to as Black). Like matrilineality, hypodescent aided in
establishing and furthering Black second-class citizenship under law. Even
more, hypodescent or one drop codes bolstered another element of the racial caste system and white supremacy. By law, one could not exit out of
what was legally a lowly status of Blackness, even after multiple generations. And these matters were not confined to the dusty archives of the
seventeenth, eighteenth, or nineteenth centuries.
In 1984, lawyers for Susie Guillory Phipps filed a suit on her behalf
to change her racial designation of “colored” to “white” on her birth
certificate. 35
Phipps,
the
50-year-old
great-great-great-greatgranddaughter of an enslaved Black woman and her owner, fit the Louisiana classification of Black, which designated Blackness by “any traceable
amount.” 36 This meant that even though Phipps was 1/128th Black, by
Louisiana law, she was still legally Black. As such, Louisiana classified her
as “colored” on her birth certificate.

33. WILLIAM WALLER HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, (1662-1682) Vol. 11, at 170, 260, 266, 270 (Richmond, Va,
1809-23).
34. See, e.g., Gonor v. Gonor, 11 Rob. 526 (La. 1845).
35. Woman Seeks Change in Racial Designation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1984, at A28.
36. Id.
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The state defended its law, claiming that if Ms. Phipps prevailed,
the state could be overwhelmed with individuals filing similar claims,
forcing the state to oppose each case and undertake genealogical research. 37 Of course, the state could simply have decided not to litigate such
cases or perform genealogical research on its citizens. Phipps lost her legal battle
“to have declared unconstitutional a state law classifying as ‘colored’ anyone with as little as one thirty-second black ancestry.”38
As in the case of Ms. Phipps, 39 even African descendants fitting the
further delineated racial classifications of “mullato,” 40 “quadroon,” 41
“octoroon” or “hexadecaroons” 42 and beyond were denied the racial
classification of “white” and the rights that attended it. Lightness in skin
color was not sufficient in a claim for whiteness.43 These laws sought to
express that multiple generations of white forbearers could not cure the
stain of African ancestry in the United States. 44
Accounting for the legalized cruelties and humiliations inflicted on
Black people, the incentives to pass as white were not insignificant. 45
Passing for white could relieve an individual from the legal, social, economic, and even health burdens associated with being Black. Famously,
after a near-fatal car accident where he suffered the loss of an eye, the
famed entertainer, Sammy Davis, Jr. was treated at the San Bernardino
County Hospital; it was the only nearby hospital that would admit Black
people when more elite medical centers would not. Neither his fame,
wealth, nor amiability allowed him to transcend the racial caste system.
If “passing” were an option, lawmakers cleverly constructed disincentives to dissuade attempts to breach the color line. For example, living
fraudulently as a white person or deceiving someone about being white
could result in legal punishment or penalty. In the sobering divorce case,
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 46 Leonard “Kip” Rhinelander, son of a

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Based on Louisiana law, Ms. Phipps arguably met the perverse racial caste status of
“octaicosahectaroon” (1/128th Black).
40. Having the status of Black based on one Black parent.
41. Having the status of Black based on one Black grandparent.
42. Having the status of Black based on one Black great grandparent.
43. This exposes not only the rigid complexities of white supremacy, but also confounding ironies.
44. As a pragmatic matter, absent a genealogical search, someone like Ms. Phipps could
“pass” or live as white so long as she or he did not draw suspicion.
45. Historically, “passing” refers to Black individuals significantly fair in complexion to
successfully live or work as white. See, e.g., ALLYSON HOBBS, A CHOSEN EXILE: A
HISTORY OF RACIAL PASSING IN AMERICAN LIFE (2014).
46. Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 157 N.E. 838 (N.Y.), aff’g 219 N.Y.S. 548 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1927).
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wealthy, socially elite, New York family, was pressured by his parents to
annul his marriage to Alice Jones, a “light” complected chambermaid and
mixed-race Black woman. Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig provides a
detailed account of this important case, including the strategies deployed
by both Leonard, the plaintiff, and his wife, the defendant. 47 Leonard’s
lawyers argued that Kip was unaware of Alice’s racial status, even though
he had lived with her family, engaged in sexual intercourse with her prior
to their marriage, and later consummated the marriage. 48
Had Alice committed fraud against Kip Rhinelander by deceiving him of her
racial identity? If she had, Kip would be entitled to an annulment of the
marriage. To answer this question, the court ordered Mrs. Rhinelander
to disrobe in front of the all-white male jury and judge.49
The defendant . . . then withdrew to the lavatory adjoining
the jury room and, after a short time, again entered the jury
room. The defendant, who was weeping, had on her underwear and a long coat. At Mr. Davis’ direction she let down
the coat, so that the upper portion of her body, as far down as
the breast, was exposed. She then, again at Mr. Davis’ direction, covered the upper part of her body and showed to the
jury her bare legs, up as far as her knees. The Court, counsel,
the jury and the plaintiff then re-entered the court room.50
Following this, Alice’s lawyer asked Leonard whether his wife’s body was
“the same shade as when [he] saw her in the Marie Antoinette with all of
her clothing removed?”51
Ultimately, Leonard’s attempt to annul the marriage failed, precisely
because he had not been deceived, the jury found her racial identity to be
obvious by the color of her breasts and legs. 52 Even while the case was
hailed in the Black press as a victory for Alice, 53 it nevertheless was a
47. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring Rhinelander v. Rhinelander As a Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage and Family, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2393
(2007).
48. Id. at 2395, 2408-09.
49. Id. at 2429.
50. Id. (citing the Transcript of Record at 696, Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 219
N.Y.S. 548 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff’d 157 N.E. 838 (N.Y. 1927)); see also ANGELA
ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V. RHINELANDER
AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY (2013).
51. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 47, at 2429.
52. Id. (citing the Transcript of Record at 696, Rhinelander v. Rhinelander, 219
N.Y.S. 548 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff’d 157 N.E. 838 (N.Y. 1927)).
53. See, e.g., Rising Above Prejudice, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Dec. 9, 1925, at 16
(“[J]urors have rendered a great service to womanhood in general and Negro womanhood in particular.”).
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powerful reminder of racial caste and the legal risks associated with
breaching the boundaries of race, even in New York. As one could not
exit the racial subordinate status of being Black, a person of any African
ancestry could never—save fraud—claim whiteness and access the rights
and privileges associated with that status. This was race segregation based
not on housing, education, or employment, but one’s DNA.
C. Anti-miscegenation Laws
A third set of laws whereby lawmakers sought to “degrade the social
and political status of African Americans and support white supremacy,”
can be found in anti-miscegenation laws. 54 By criminalizing and otherwise prohibiting interracial marriage, such as barring the distribution of
marriage licenses or the solemnization of such unions, legislatures further
fortified the racial caste system. Anti-miscegenation laws were broad in
scope. In Virginia, it was illegal to leave the state to marry; it was a felony
“if any white person intermarry with a colored person”; and a state provision voided “all marriages between ‘a white person and a colored person’ without any judicial proceeding.” 55 Like matrilineality and hypodescent laws, these provisions responded to nativist fears associate with
“blurred . . . lines between what many [whites] understood to be a naturally superior white race and a naturally inferior black race.” 56 According
to Carlos A. Ball, “[a]s long as there was a clear distinction between the
two racial categories—in other words, as long as the two categories could
be thought to be mutually exclusive—then the hierarchical racial regimes
represented first by slavery, and later by legal segregation, could be more
effectively defended.”57
Often lawmakers defended the necessity and urgency to adopt such
laws in religious terms and on the basis of preserving moral order. Indeed, courts upheld such laws on that basis.58 As the Supreme Court took

54. See, e.g., Amber D. Moulton, Closing the “Floodgate of Impurity”: Moral Reform, Antislavery, and Interracial Marriage in Antebellum Massachusetts, 3 J. CIVIL WAR ERA 2, 2
(2013); see also Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2733 (2008) (explaining “[i]t is
not possible, in other words, to understand fully the historical roots and purposes of antimiscegenation laws without an assessment of the role that concerns related to interracial
children played in their enactment and enforcement”); and see Karen Woods Weierman,
“For the Better Government of Servants and Slaves”: The Law of Slavery and Miscegenation, 24
LEGAL STUD. F. 133, 133-34 (2000) (explaining how race and sex were treated as interconnected and interdependent concerns).
55. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1967).
56. Ball, supra note 54, at 2734.
57. Id.
58. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
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notice in Loving v. Virginia, the trial judge convicted and sentenced Mildred Jeter, a Black woman and Richard, a white man, for violating Virginia’s “Racial Integrity Act of 1924,” which was enacted during a “period of extreme nativism . . . follow[ing] the end of the First World
War.” 59
At their sentencing for violating the Virginia statutes barring interracial marriage, the trial court expressed:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but
for the interference with his arrangement there would be no
cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.60
In this case, police raided the couple’s home, while they were sleeping, and arrested Mildred, who was pregnant at the time, incarcerating
her for several days. The couple was legally married in Washington,
D.C., and they displayed their marriage certificate in their home. Nevertheless, a local grand jury issued an indictment “charging the Lovings
with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages,” and weeks later
the couple “pleaded guilty to the charge and were sentenced to one year
in jail.” 61 The sentencing judge suspended their sentence for a “period of
25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and not return
to Virginia together for 25 years.” 62
Four years later, in 1964, the Lovings filed motions to vacate the
judgment and to have the sentence set aside on the basis that the Virginia
law violated the Fourteenth Amendment. A state trial judge denied their
motions. The couple faced a cruel ultimatum: live outside of the state in
marital union but away from their families, or return as a couple, risking
incarceration and the state ignoring their marital union. Their fate as a
couple was further complicated by the fact that Virginia was not the only
state to ban or refuse to recognize interracial marriages. The couple appealed once more. Thereafter, the state’s highest court, the Supreme
Court of Appeals, “upheld the constitutionality of the antimiscegenation
statutes,” affirmed their convictions, and modified their sentences.63
The Lovings successfully petitioned their case to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing the Virginia law violated both equal protection
under the law and substantive due process.64 At the time of their litigation
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 2.
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in 1967, sixteen states prohibited and punished “marriages on the basis of
racial classification.” 65 Among the arguments put forth by Virginia to defend its racial purity law, including “that the State’s legitimate purposes
were ‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,’ and to prevent ‘the
corruption of blood,’ . . . and ‘the obliteration of racial pride,’” was that
the law applied equally to both the white husband and Black wife. 66
Citing Pace v. Alabama, 67 Virginia argued that “the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause . . . is only that state penal laws containing interracial element as a part of the definition of the offense must apply equally
to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are punished to the same degree.”68 This legal strategy stretched the meaning of
the Court’s rulings in Railwsay Express Agency 69 (involving a statute “discriminating between the kinds of advertising which may be displayed on
trucks in New York City”) 70 and Allied Stores of Ohio 71 (addressing “an
exemption in Ohio’s ad valorem tax for merchandise owned by a nonresident in a storage warehouse”). 72 Neither case involved racial discrimination laws. Handing down its landmark decision, striking down the Virginia laws and by extension all others that proscribed interracial marriage,
the Court stated:
There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. . . . These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 73
Many, though not all, anti-miscegenation laws were enacted after
the abolition of slavery just as confederate monuments were erected
across the United States as symbols of white supremacy and to protect racial order and hierarchy during Jim Crow.74 Anti-miscegenation or “anti-

65. Id. at 6.
66. Id. at 7-8.
67. Id. at 10 (citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)).
68. Id. at 7–8.
69. Id. at 8 (citing Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 9 (citing Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 12.
74. Kathy Eyre, Mississippi Still Far From Accepting Interracial Marriage, AP NEWS (Nov.
28, 1987), https://apnews.com/article/d57930264fd39578c14f3f64f2cec4e8; ARK. CODE
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amalgamation” laws predated slavery’s abolition and were consistent with
proslavery policies within states. States in the North as well as the South
adopted such laws. Neither slavery nor the racial caste system were geographically confined to southern states. To the contrary, just as slavery
was operational in northern territories and states, including New York,75
Connecticut, 76 and Pennsylvania, 77 so too were laws denying interracial
marriages. 78
Northerners “were not unmindful of the danger racial equality
posed to national union” as well as the importance of maintaining slavery. 79 For example, in 1705, colonial lawmakers in Massachusetts enacted
an anti-miscegenation law based significantly on Virginia’s existing law. 80
As in Virginia, “the development of miscegenation law was directly related to the growth of slavery.” 81 In fact, “Massachusetts was also the first
colony explicitly to authorize slavery by law.”82
And, “[u]ntil February 1843, when the state legislature repealed a
statute that banned marriages between whites and ‘Negroes, Indians, or
Mulattos,’ interracial couples in Massachusetts found their unions declared null and void, their children were classed as ‘illegitimate,’ and any
official who solemnized an interracial union could be fined.” 83 Despite
the law’s repeal, interracial intimacy remained unsettled in Massachusetts.
In 1913, the Massachusetts legislature adopted a law that prevented couples from a marriage safe harbor or sanctuary in their state if denied a
marriage license elsewhere. 84 In essence, after the repeal of the Massachu-

ANN. § 55-104 (1947), reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 44 (Pauli
Murray ed., 1950); DEL. REV. CODE Ch. 85, § 3485 (1935), reprinted in id. at 72; KY.
REV. STAT. § 402.020 (1948), reprinted in id. at 168; LA. CIV. CODE art. 94 (1947), reprinted in id. at 190; MD. CODE art. 27, § 445 (1939), reprinted in id. at 207–08; TEX. PENAL
CODE, art. 492 (1947), reprinted in id. at 452; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4697 (1943), reprinted
in id. at 511.
75. Adele Oltman, The Hidden History of Slavery In New York, NATION (Oct. 24, 2005),
https://www.thenation.com/article/hidden-history-slavery-new-york/.
76. EDGAR J. MCMANUS, BLACK BONDAGE IN THE NORTH 169-70 (1973) (“Connecticut’s lawmakers were extremely cautious about moving against slavery. Negroes
were more numerous in the state than in the rest of New England combined, and racial
anxieties were correspondingly more acute.”).
77. GARY B. NASH & JEAN R. SODERLUND, FREEDOM BY DEGREES: EMANCIPATION
IN PENNSYLVANIA AND ITS AFTERMATH 55 (1991).
78. See, e.g., Moulton, supra note 54, at 5-7.
79. Id. at 6.
80. Weierman, supra note 54, at 146.
81. Id. at 144.
82. Id. at 145.
83. See e.g., Moulton, supra note 54, at 2.
84. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (1913); see also Zebulon Miletsky, The
Dilemma of Interracial Marriage: The Boston NAACP and the National Equal Rights League,
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setts anti-miscegenation law, only interracial couples who were citizens
of that state could marry there.
Rhode Island, 85 Illinois, 86 Iowa, 87 Kansas, 88 Maine, 89 Michigan, 90
Pennsylvania, 91 and Ohio 92 are among the northern states that enacted
laws banning interracial marriage. Alabama, 93 Florida, 94 Mississippi,95
North Carolina, 96 South Carolina, 97 and Tennessee 98 found interracial
marriage so abhorrent that they ratified their constitutions to bar such unions. 99 And, though the Supreme Court’s ruling in Loving v. Virginia ultimately struck down all such laws, effectively making it legal to marry
someone of a different race, states continued to delay repealing statutes
and constitutional amendments banning interracial marriage. It was only
in 1987 that “Mississippi voters repealed by a narrow 52 percent to 48
percent margin the state’s 1890 constitutional ban on interracial marriage.” 100 As stunning as that may seem, “Mississippi didn’t grant its first

1912-1927, 44 HIST. J. MASS. 137, 140 (2016); and see AMBER D. MOULTON, THE FIGHT
(2015).
85. Act of Mar. 23, 1881, ch. 846, 1881 R.I. Pub. Laws 108 (repealing ban on interracial marriage).
86. Act of Jan. 17, 1829, sec. 3, 1832 Ill. Laws 465 (banning interracial marriage).
87. Act of Jan. 6, 1840, ch. 25, 1839 Iowa Acts 42 (banning interracial marriage).
88. Compare 1855 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 108 § 3 (banning interracial marriage), with 1857
Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 49 (omitting language banning interracial marriages).
89. Act of Mar. 12, 1883, ch. 203, 1883 Me. Laws 167 (repealing ban on interracial
marriage).
90. 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 16, reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra
note 74, at 230 (amending an 1871 statute to validate interracial marriage contracts).
91. 1725 Pa. Laws 145 (prohibiting ministers from approving interracial marriages).
92. 1861 Ohio Laws 6 (prohibiting interracial marriage).
93. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 102 (annulled 2000); ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 360 (1958), reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 74, at 246.
94. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 24, reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 74, at 77; FLA. STAT. § 741.11 (1941), reprinted in id. at 83.
95. MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263 (repealed 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 459 (1942),
reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 74, at 246; Eyre, supra note
74.
96. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 8, reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra
note 74, at 329; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-181 (1953) (repealed 1973).
97. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 33 (repealed 1999), reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE
AND COLOR, supra note 74, at 407; S.C. CODE § 8571 (1942), reprinted in id. at 417.
98. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 14 (repealed 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8409 (1934),
reprinted in STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 74, at 438.
99. James R. Browning, Anti-Miscegenation Laws in the United States, 1 DUKE B.J. 26,
31 (1951).
100. Eyre, supra note 74.
FOR INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM MASSACHUSETTS
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marriage license to an interracial couple until 1970, under a federal
judge’s order.”101
One matter in common among all the states that banned interracial
marriages is that they all prohibited “Negro-white marriages.” 102 Some
states barred Asian-white unions 103 and still others banned Indigenouswhite unions. 104 Commonly, geography dictated these laws. 105 No state
barring interracial marriages excluded Black-white unions from their discriminatory policies.
That forty-one states prohibited interracial marriage at one point in
time gives a sense of the scope and scale of states’ efforts to proscribe interracial marriage and preserve white racial purity. The broad enactment
of anti-miscegenation legislation expressed the accepted view that maintaining the primacy and purity of whiteness necessitated a collective effort. It required mass compliance and comprehensive adherence to maintain the herd immunity of whiteness. As such, more than law mattered.
Social compliance and adherence mattered. Even while hypodescent legislation provided a sturdy buffer against Black people exiting their status,
anti-miscegenation laws spoke explicitly of the stunning contempt in
which Black people were held.
D. Eugenics
The guarding of racial purity intensified during postReconstruction in the United States, so much so that it began to impact
whether white Americans were permitted to control their reproduction
intra-racially. In 1927, more than twenty years after the first eugenics law
was enacted in Indiana, the United States Supreme Court issued the
landmark decision of Buck v. Bell, upholding the constitutionality of Virginia’s Eugenical Sterilization Act. 106 In an 8-1 decision, the Court ruled
the constitutional authority to impose vaccine mandates is broad enough
to compel the forced sterilization of women and men deemed socially
101. Id.
102. Browning, supra note 99, at 31.
103. See, e.g., Deenesh Sohoni, Unsuitable Suitors: Anti-Miscegenation Laws, Naturalization
Laws, and the Construction of Asian Identities, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 587, 587 (2007) (explaining that in 1861, “Nevada became the first state to pass a law specifically barring marriages
between whites and Asians. Over the course of the next century, until the 1967 Supreme
Court decision Loving v. Virginia declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional, an
additional 14 states came to ban marriages between whites and Asians.”).
104. Browning, supra note 99, at 31.
105. See Sohoni, supra note 103, at 587 (explaining that “[t]he first states to pass antimiscegenation statutes against Asians were located primarily in the West, but over the
next hundred years states in the Midwest, South, and East also enacted such laws.”).
106. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
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107

unfit. Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes issued a
haunting condemnation of vulnerable white women, declaring “three
generations of imbeciles are enough.”108
The case centered on Carrie Buck, whom Justice Holmes described
as “a feeble-minded white woman.” 109 He claimed that she was the
“daughter of a feeble-minded mother”110 and “the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child.”111 Notwithstanding the troubling inaccuracies
of these statements, even if they were true, should the state possess such authority as to dictate who should be able to parent?
The state presented evidence that the Court found persuasive. One
evaluation of Carrie’s “fitness” came from Harry H. Laughlin, who, although not a physician (and though he never examined her), 112 was a distinguished leader in the eugenics movement, serving as superintendent of
the Eugenics Record Office of the Department of Genetics at the Carnegie Institute and the “eugenics expert” to various congressional committees, including the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.113
In Carrie Buck’s case, her poverty, perceived intellectual shortcomings, teenage pregnancy (the result of a rape), and family history of alcoholism were invoked to justify the state’s reprisal and her sterilization.114
The Court found:
It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already
sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not
felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our
being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for

107. See id. (upholding a Virginia law which required the sterilization of incompetent
persons). Carrie Buck, a victim of rape at age sixteen, bore a child out of wedlock. The
state of Virginia claimed that Buck possessed low social character and intelligence; it predicted that were she to have more children they would be born of inferior intelligence.
She and others like her were collected by public health officials to be sterilized. However,
years after the case, Holmes and public health officials in Virginia were proven wrong,
Buck’s daughter, Vivian, was a successful student—well above average.
108. Buck, 274 US at 207.
109. Id. at 205.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 51 (1985).
113. Harry H. Laughlin, PICKLER MEM’L LIBR., TRUMAN STATE UNIV., http://
library.truman.edu/manuscripts/laughlinbio.asp [https://perma.cc/LC57-Y224] (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
114. See, e.g., Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck’s Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT 331,
334-35
(1985), https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/164572/02_02_
Gould.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC6D-V8AJ].
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crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind. 115
In the wake of the Supreme Court declaring the Virginia eugenics
law constitutional, more than sixty thousand Americans were convicted
of social unfitness and surrendered to public health officials for compulsory sterilizations. 116 Eugenics further guarded white racial purity, by policing and restricting undesirable white people from “continuing their
kind.” 117 Compulsory sterilization laws reflected the cruel and inhumane
lengths to which white elites dared to go in order to refine and preserve
whiteness.
At the heart of eugenics laws was a political and legal commitment
to surveillance, government intrusion, reprisal, and retribution to discourage not only vice, but also sex, single parenting, and reproduction
among the socially undesirable. At their core, these policies were rooted
in social judgments about the poor and served to further shape social and
legal understandings about whiteness.
Conclusion
To understand racial ordering in the United States, one should
begin by examining the law and studying closely judicial opinions, legislation, and legal ordinances. That is, rather than considering racist law
some strange anomaly, one should understand that racial caste and ordering in the United States were purposefully created and maintained by law
and legal institutions. Indeed, slavery itself was not only an economic institution but also one of law.
Importantly, the creation of racial caste in the United States was
achieved through the regulation of women’s bodies and sex. Legislation
governing matrilineality, laws related to hypodescent, bans on interracial
marriage, and eugenics—namely the forced sterilization of people viewed
as unfit for the American ideal reinforced caste and racial hierarchies. The
results were not only peculiar—such as hypodescent laws—but also cruel.

115. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (ruling “the principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes”).
116. Kim Severson, Thousands Sterilized, a State Weighs Restitution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9,
2011), at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/us/redress-weighed-for-forcedsterilizations-in-north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/56MU-P9QZ].
117. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
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Part II: The Endurance and Preservation of Slavery Through
Transformation
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”118
The racial caste system is an ecosystem founded on legal and social
tenets of racial hierarchy and dominance. A belief in white supremacy
and Black inferiority is the foundation of racial caste. For those whose
lives had previously been physically tethered to slavery, myriad postReconstruction laws further fastened them to an inferior status where
there was little or no relief from the Supreme Court. The American racial caste system became the nightmare that never ceased at abolition’s
dawn. As Justice Douglas concurred in 1968 in Jones v. Mayer Co.,119
“[s]ome badges of slavery remain today. While the institution has been
outlawed, it has remained in the minds and hearts of many white
men.” 120 What explains this?
Taking seriously Justice Douglas’s observation that “[c]ases which
have come to this Court depict a spectacle of slavery unwilling to die,”121
Part II turns to the archives of American law to make visible law’s role in
fomenting racial caste in the United States. As such, it renders visible
overlooked legal history relevant to the maintenance and transformation
of slavery’s badges, namely in the Constitution’s Thirteenth Amendment.
As prior work argues, neither the values undergirding the Thirteenth
Amendment nor the practice of slavery ended at its abolition. 122 Rather,
slavery persists through its transformation; it endures and evolves. This
dynamic is what scholar Reva Siegel describes as “preservation-throughtransformation.” 123

118. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
119. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Goodwin, supra note 30, at 908.
123. On the question of slavery, she wrote, “White Americans who emphatically opposed slavery regularly disagreed about what it would mean to emancipate AfricanAmericans. Some defined freedom from slavery as equality in civil rights; others insisted
that emancipating African-Americans from slavery entailed equality in civil and political
rights; but most white Americans who opposed slavery did not think its abolition required
giving African-Americans equality in ‘social rights.’” See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111, 1119-20 (1997).
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Part II argues that the racial caste system is further exemplified by
the Thirteenth Amendment’s punishment clause, the debate about the
law, and the prohibition on one form of slavery while sanctioning and
preserving others. In the immediate wake of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification, this included the reappropriation and transformation
of Black labor through Black Codes, crop liens, lifetime labor, debt peonage, and apprenticeship provisions. Today, this includes prison labor
that tethers America’s overwhelming consumption of mass incarceration. 124
A. The Debate: Equality That Was Never Meant to Be
In the United States, those at the lower rungs of society achieve social caste not only by birth status but also by laws, practices, and conditions that seek to denigrate, humiliate, embarrass, cause suffering, and
otherwise interfere with dignity interests. Like the castes in other societies—such as India, famous for rendering a whole set of people “untouchable” or what became of Germany during the rise of Adolf Hitler,
the Third Reich, and the Nazi occupation of government and society—
so too America’s practices of racial caste persist beyond slavery’s abolition,
Reconstruction, and Jim Crow. 125
Perhaps no better evidence of slavery’s persistence beyond the Thirteenth Amendment is the law itself. The amendment codifies the persistence of slavery through its punishment clause. This clause, often overlooked by legal academics and therefore barely engaged in law schools,
explicitly permits “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” as “punishment
for crime,” where the person has “been duly convicted.” 126 At the time
of its drafting, senators from slaveholding states vigilantly negotiated for a
compromise to permit slavery’s continuance under ratified conditions. As
the punishment clause has never been repealed, the institution has survived—largely unseen—by those least affected. It remains a deleterious
plague that continues to infect our democracy.
The author of the punishment clause, Senator John Brooks Henderson, an outspoken Missouri slave owner, favored adopting a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery that contained a punishment exception

124. Michele Goodwin, We Can’t Be Free Until We Fully Abolish Slavery, APPEAL (Oct.
7, 2020), https://theappeal.org/authors/michele-bratcher-goodwin/; Kiera Feldman, California Kept Prison Factories Open. Inmates Worked for Pennies An Hour As COVID-19 Spread,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-10-11
/california-prison-factories-inmates-covid-19.
125. See, e.g., PAULI MURRAY, STATES LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1951).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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similar to The Northwest Ordinance of 1787. That law prohibited
slavery in the new western territory except “in the punishment of crimes
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” 128 Opposition to this
language and efforts to introduce an even more explicit abolition of slavery that elevated the human rights of all persons proved futile.
For example, Senator Charles Sumner, a widely respected abolitionist, objected to the Punishment Clause and proposed an amendment
based on France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
that asserted the equality of all men. His amendment stated:
All persons are equal before the law, so that no person can
hold another as a slave; and the Congress may make all laws
necessary and proper to carry this article into effect everywhere within the United States and the jurisdictions thereof.129
Drawing from international law, he argued, “the constitutional charter of
August 1830, at the installation of Louis Philippe as king, with La Fayette
by his side, contains the articles . . . placing the declaration of equality before the law in the front.”130 Senator Sumner pointed to the fact that “this
article has been adopted in the charters of Belgium, Italy, Greece; so it is
now a well-known expression of a commanding principle of human
rights.” 131 According to Sumner, “equality before the law” manifested
“precision to that idea of human rights which is enumerated in our Declaration of Independence.”132
Senators vehemently opposed to ending slavery rejected the principles outlined by Sumner. Senator Lazarus Powell spoke at length denouncing the notion that Black people were anything but property. 133 He
rebuffed the idea that “it was ever designed by the founders of [the United States] that the Constitution of the United States should be so amended as to destroy property.”134 He argued, “I do not believe it is the province of the Federal Government to say what is or what is not

127. Scott W. Howe, Slavery as Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983,
990 (2009).
128. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, art. 6 (1787).
129. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1483 (1864).
130. Id. (emphasis in the original).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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property.” The province of government, according to Powell, is to
“guard, protect, and secure, rather than to destroy.”136
In his complete rejection of a constitutional amendment to abolish
slavery, Powell called it illogical, comparing the government’s abolition
of slavery to the federal government regulating “every domestic matter in
the States.” 137 Powell warned that if an amendment to abolish slavery
were to succeed, Congress might next interfere with matters of “parent
and child, husband and wife, and guardian and ward.”138 Notably, existing laws and social practices made the domestic sphere hostile for women. Marital rape was legal 139 and domestic violence a matter of private regard. 140
In State v. Oliver, a North Carolina court advised that while its position had evolved: “We may assume that the old doctrine, that a husband
had a right to whip his wife, provided he use a switch no larger than his
thumb, is not law in North Carolina.” 141 Still “if no permanent injury has
been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence shown by the
husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and
leave the parties to forget and forgive.” 142 This was the common view. In
Abbott v. Abbott, the court denied Mrs. Abbott the opportunity to recover
for injuries sustained after a brutal beating by her husband, which required hospitalization. 143 The court explained the “husband and wife are
one person.”144
In the view of those committed to the South’s enterprise, its defeat
in the Civil War did little to elevate the humanity or social status of
Black people. For those who clung to the economic profitability and cap135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. In 1736, Sir Matthew Hale’s highly acclaimed treatise, Historia Placitorum Coronae,
History of the Pleas of the Crown, maintained that it was impossible for a woman to be raped
by her husband. Hale proclaimed that a “husband cannot be guilty of rape” because marriage conveys unconditional consent, whereby wives have entered a binding contract and
“hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.” No prior
English common law articulated this standard, but Hale’s new rule found broad support
among parliamentarians and subsequently influenced legal developments in the British
colonies and in the United States. Nearly every state legislature enacted laws that shielded
husbands from criminal punishment for raping their wives (and sometimes even girlfriends). In 1993, North Carolina was the last state to rescind the marital rape exemption.
SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1736).
140. Id.
141. State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 62 (1874).
142. Id.
143. 67 Me. 304 (1877).
144. Id. at 305.
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italism of human slavery, the rationales for human kidnapping, trafficking, and bondage persisted. One means of keeping the ideology of slavery
alive was to create the chattel in Black people. That is, slavery thrived on
the notion that Black people were no different in spirit, mind, or comportment than common field stock. A belief in the humanity of enslaved
persons, such as that promoted by Senator Sumner, contradicted the view
proffered by Powell (that Black people lacked human status). To make
himself perfectly clear, Senator Powell cautioned that if the federal government were to “strike down property in slaves, it certainly would have
the right to strike down property in horses.”145
In debate, Senator Sumner argued against both a lengthier amendment with the punishment clause and the revised, condensed form that
currently stands. He doubted the wisdom in reproducing the “Jeffersonian ordinance” because the language was inconducive to the challenge before the government of constitutionally abolishing slavery in the wake of
the Civil War. 146 Simply put, the language of the ordinance was “inapplicable” to the matter at hand. 147 He reminded Senate colleagues, “slavery
in our day is something distinct, perfectly well known, requiring no
words of distinction outside itself” and queried, why therefore add the
punishment clause? 148 Not only was the language surplusage, but also it
introduced “doubt” as to the Senate’s intent to end slavery.
With uncanny omniscience, Senator Sumner warned, “We should
consider well that the language that we adopt here in this Chamber today will in all probability be adopted by the House . . . Once having
passed this body, it is substantially beyond correction.” 149 His urge for
caution likely reflected a keen understanding of the various forms of slavery. He understood the great lengths those invested in slavery would pursue to secure its continuance.
From the outset, southern lawmakers, plantation owners (sometimes
one in the same), as well as northerners profiting from slavery, scored
victories in Congress,150 state legislatures, 151 and in courts to maintain slav-

145. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1483 (1864).
146. Id. at 1488 (explaining, “[t]here was a reason” and “habit in certain parts of the
country to convict persons or doom them as slaves for life as a punishment for crime, and
it was not proposed to prohibit this habit”).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864); Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864); Act of Apr. 7, 1820, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 544;
Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545; Records of Joint Committees of Congress, Record
Group 128, 1789-1989, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.archives.gov
/research/guide-fed-records/groups/128.html (admitting Missouri to the Union as a
“slave state,” to preserve their balance of power in the federal government. “Be it enacted
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152

ery. American Slaveholders violated domestic and international laws in
furtherance of their trade. 153 Meanwhile, in European cities, boycotts ensued on certain American goods, in protest of slavery. 154 Even though the
1807 Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves made the continued kidnapping and importation of Africans illegal, the law was too frequently ig155
nored. Likely not lost on Senator Sumner was the cold reality that despite the 1807 Act, “cargoes of negroes [were] imported from Africa”
regularly, according to journalists.156 In 1860, mere years before Sumner
took to the Senate Chambers to argue for the equality of Black peoples,
the New York Times reported:
Several cargoes of negroes have, it is notorious, been imported
from Africa within the last year, and have been distributed
through the interior with greater or less publicity. The perpetrators of the offence have been well known; in fact, so far
from concealing their share in it, have gloried in it. We have
not yet heard of the conviction and punishment of one of
them. The Federal officials have either winked at the crime,

by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress
assembled, That the inhabitants of that portion of the Missouri territory included within
the boundaries herein after designated, be, and they are hereby, authorized to form for
themselves a constitution and state government, and to assume such name as they shall
deem proper; and the said state, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union, upon an
equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatsoever . . . .”).
151. See Michael E. Ruane, Freedom and Slavery, The ‘Central Paradox of American History, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/freedom-andslavery-the-central-paradox-of-american-history/2019/04/30/16063754-2e3a-11e9813a-0ab2f17e305b_story.html (“In October 1705, Virginia passed a law stating that if a
master happened to kill a slave who was undergoing “correction,” it was not a crime. Indeed, the act would be viewed as if it had never happened.”).
152. See generally Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857); United
States v. Booth, 59 U.S. 476 (1856); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
153. For example, Congress enacted the 1807 Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves.
Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves of 1807, Pub. L. No. 9-222, Stat. 426. However, as
an 1860 New York Times article reported, “[t]he laws are on the statute-book, and anybody who likes to obey them may do so; but any one [sic] who does not like to obey
them need not.” The Slave Trade and the Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1860, at 4.
154. Jason Rodrigues, Lincoln’s Great Debt to Manchester, GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 2013, 6:15
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2013/feb/04
/lincoln-oscars-manchester-cotton-abraham (“But in 1862, Lancashire mill workers, at
great personal sacrifice, took a principled stand by refusing to touch raw cotton picked by
US slaves.”).
155. Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves of 1807, Pub. L. No. 9-222, Stat. 426
(1807); The Slave Trade and the Election, supra note 153.
156. The Slave Trade and the Election, supra note 153.
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or pursued it with such laxity that they might better have suf157
fered it to pass altogether unnoticed.
Those invested in slavery, including in the North, used violence as
a means of intimidation and as a threat to maintain the institution. 158 Famously, Pennsylvania Hall was burned down by an anti-abolitionist
mob. 159 In Boston, pro-slavery mobs frequently and violently interrupted
meetings sponsored by abolitionists who threatened the business interests
of wealthy Bostonians whose textile mills processed slave-produced goods
from the South. 160 As a response to their reporting on the conditions of
American slavery, early American press outlets, including The Liberator,
managed by the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, regularly faced attacks. 161
The Negro History Bulletin reported on the mobs that threatened
abolitionists. A 1944 article chronicled the various death threats, smashing
of printing presses, and broad attempts (and successful efforts) to undermine freedom of the press. 162 Very likely, these incidents were not unfamiliar to abolitionists like Senator Sumner. For example, Elijah P.
Lovejoy, a Presbyterian minister from Maine, was ultimately murdered
defending his press.163
In 1837, a slave was accused of a serious crime and tried in the
“Lynch Court” by a man named Judge Lawless. The slave was
found guilty and sentenced to be burned alive. Lovejoy protested in his newspaper to no avail; and when he persisted after the slave had been executed, a mob broke in his office and
smashed his printing press. He was driven out of St. Louis and
moved about twenty miles up the river to Alton, Illinois
where he started a similar paper known as The Alton Observer. His press was destroyed two more times, and he finally met
a violent death while defending his press against a third Alton
mob. 164

157. Id.
158. See Pennsylvania Hall 1838, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2938.html.
159. Id.
160. William Lloyd Garrison & James Brown Yerrinton, LIBERATOR NEWSPAPER, January 3, 1835, https://ark.digitalcommonwealth.org/ark:/50959/9w032w563 (accessed
November 23, 2020).
161. Id.; see also, William Lawless Jones, Mob Violence Against Abolitionists in The South, 7
NEGRO HIST. BULL. 134 (March 1944).
162. W. Sherman Savage, A Defense of the Freedom of the Press, 8 NEGRO HIST. BULL. 31,
31–33, 41–43 (Nov. 1944).
163. Jones, supra note 161, at 137.
164. Id.
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If not for strange social and political resistance to unpacking America’s history of enslavement, it would appear almost obvious that advocates of slavery embraced and shrewdly deployed violence, mastering not
only tools of brawn, but also political and economic power. Their political influence, and pressure to maintain an iron grip on chattel slavery,
proved successful. As history records, this included their advocacy for the
Congressional enactment of Fugitive Slave laws of 1793 165 and 1850,
which not only returned many who had escaped from slavery, but also
contributed to the kidnapping of free or freed persons into slavery.166
Notably, Senator Sumner’s determination to incorporate language
that “all persons are equal” into the Thirteenth Amendment failed. He
firmly corrected Senator Howard, who persisted in describing the
Sumner amendment as emphasizing “freedom” rather than “equality.”
Several times, Senator Sumner responded, “it is equal,” to which Senator
Howard replied, the distinction between being free and being equal is
“immaterial,” and “utterly insignificant.” 167 However, the difference between the language of freedom versus equality in the Thirteenth
Amendment was no less important than what colonists fought for against
the British or drafted into the Declaration of Independence.
The debate about equality, freedom, and the Punishment Clause in
the Thirteenth Amendment reveals two concerns. First, even senators
opposed to slavery indicated discomfort with the concept of Black people
being equal in stature and law to white people. Second, equality baked
into the Constitution interfered with patriarchal norms and power relationships between men and women, husbands and wives. Senator Howard spoke to the anticipated dangers: “I suppose before the law a woman
165. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (repealed 1864). Section 4’s penalty
clause was drafted to impose significant penalties such as to dissuade even the staunchest
abolitionist from providing aid to persons fleeing slavery:
That any person who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder such
claimant, his agent, or attorney, in so seizing or arresting such fugitive from
labor, or shall rescue such fugitive from such claimant, his agent or attorney,
when so arrested pursuant to the authority herein given and declared; or
shall harbor or conceal such person after notice that he or she was a fugitive
from labor, as aforesaid, shall, for either of the said offences, forfeit and pay
the sum of five hundred dollars. Which penalty may be recovered by and for
the benefit of such claimant, by action of debt, in any Court proper to try
the same, saving moreover to the person claiming such labor or service his
right of action for or on account of the said injuries, or either of them.
Id.; see also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); RICHARD BELL, STOLEN: FIVE
FREE BOYS KIDNAPPED INTO SLAVERY AND THEIR ASTONISHING ODYSSEY HOME
(2019).
166. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864).
167. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864).
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would be as free as a man. A wife would be equal to her husband and as
free as her husband before the law.” 168 In essence, early attempts to establish Black people’s equality under the law suffered because of the threat
of dislodging male dominance domestically and the dismantling of a racialized monopoly on power.
Before the debate ended, Senator James Alexander McDougall of
California offered an impassioned defense on the importance of equality,
explaining, “I shall not be set down in any place by any man as a person
who does not love freedom in all its forms.” 169 He argued, “I do not believe that from Maine, Vermont, or New Hampshire, or Massachusetts,
or Connecticut, or Rhode Island . . . there comes a man who is more attached to the establishment and maintenance of free institutions than I
am myself.” 170 He was a contemporary of Abraham Lincoln, had practiced law in Illinois, and by historical counts, he and Lincoln were
friends. However, on the question of equality or freedom for the formerly enslaved, he made three key arguments worth observing.
First, he offered a warning that Black people might be better off enslaved than free, because of the “vices” and “violence” that might arise in
white people objecting to their freedom. 171 He warned that a policy
granting freedom “will ingulf [sic] them. It is as simple a truth as has ever
been taught by history.”172 Clearly a strange and troubling argument that Black people should not gain freedom because it might stir anger and
violence in white Americans - that nevertheless proved prescient. Interestingly, McDougall did not urge or suggest a political (or criminal) response to this real threat of violence. Ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment ended one form of slavery and transformed it into another.
Under constant surveillance and criminal law traps, conditions of
slavery returned for many Black people in the form of convict leasing,
peonage, Black Codes, and even refined apprenticeship laws designed to
literally kidnap Black children from their parents and hold them in service for up to twenty years. As well, post-Reconstruction witnessed the
birth and rise of the Ku Klux Klan; rampant lynching throughout the
United States, which included targeting Black women and children; and
the introduction of Jim Crow policies.
Second, even as a friend of “freedom” and “equality,” Senator
McDougall, like others in the non-slaveholding class, believed in the racial caste system embedded in U.S. law and baked into the fabric of our
nation. Lauded as a gifted orator, he took the floor warning that “the Af168.
169.
170.
.
171
172.

Id.
Id. at 1490.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rican race and the Europeans are different.” He claimed “it as a fact established by science that the eighth generation of the mixed race formed
by the union of the African and European cannot continue their species.” 174 Rich with eugenics imagery and citing no evidence, he appealed
to fellow senators, “quadroons have few children; with octoroons reproduction is impossible.” 175 According to him, “it establishes as a law of nature that the African has no proper relation to the European, Caucasian
blood.” 176
Third, to the extent that the seeds of the racial caste system grew
deeply in southern soil, so too did its roots reach the aquifers in the
north. Even while Black people found safe harbors in certain northern
towns, racism and white supremacy also persisted in northern colonies,
territories, and states. According to Senator McDougall, the formerly enslaved would be destined to life in the South, “where they belong,”177
and not necessarily in the north where those of his class built their lives.
According to McDougall, “nature” may well “revolt” at Black people’s
freedom and equality. 178 He along with Senators Davis, Hendricks, Powell, Riddle, and Saulsbury voted against the Thirteenth Amendment.179
B. Preservation of Slavery Through Transformation: Making Convicts of
Freed People
There is no denying the articulated opposition to slavery in legislatures, courts, and society generally in the United States. Yet, despite “repeated condemnation of slavery,” such united opposition to the practice
“may instead function to exonerate practices contested in the present,
none of which looks so unremittingly ‘evil’ by contrast.”180 Thus, if the
first American history of slavery preceded 1865, the second wave began
at the dawn of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s final version emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee with Senator Henderson’s language, permitting
both involuntary servitude and perpetual slavery as constitutionally sanctioned punishments for committing crimes. By the end of 1865, Southern states enacted numerous “Black Codes,” criminal laws that only ap-

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Siegel, supra note 123, at 1113.
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plied to “Blacks and Mullatoes.” As Herbert Hill explained, “proliferation of infamous Black Codes and Jim Crow laws conspired to deliver
newly freed blacks to the statutory status of nonslaves but not to the equal
rights of American citizenship; they were still the bondsmen of subjugation and exploitation.” 182 In other words, the Thirteenth Amendment’s
textual abolition of slavery did not reach the lived conditions of Black
people. Southerners could in fact, as they did, oppose slavery and practice
it at the same time under a new guise sanctioned by Congress under the
Punishment Clause.
As Part II.B briefly demonstrates in this Article, and as chronicled in
greater detail elsewhere, 183 although Black peoples’ previous condition of
servitude was textually abolished by the 1865 ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the vestiges of slavery lingered and transformed, buttressed by law, further instantiating racial inequality. History offers two
accounts regarding the abolition of American slavery. The first is that
with the December 19, 1865 ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment,
slavery in the United States ended, opening a new period of reconstructing the Union. This version of legal history is, for the most part, what
law professors teach their students and largely forms social, political, and
academic understanding in the United States. 184
Others believe President Lincoln’s wartime Emancipation Proclamation Act liberated all Black people. This is an enduring error in the
popular annals of slavery. Those who take this view fail to understand
that states conciliatory toward and willing to join the Union were not
obliged to end slavery in their territories.185 Without Congressional action
at the conclusion of the Civil War, those states would be permitted to
legally enforce slavery and continue life as before. As most Americans
understand it, either through the Emancipation Proclamation or the
Thirteenth Amendment, slavery ended. Simply put, this theory that slavery died with Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation is an error.

181. See Goodwin, supra note 30, at 937; see, e.g., HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 13-15 (1985).

182. See, e.g., HILL, supra note 181, at 13–15.
183. See Goodwin, supra note 30, at 933–51.
184. Angela F. Chan, America Never Abolished Slavery, HUFFINGTON POST (May 2,
2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/angela-f-chan/america-never-abolished-slaveryb_6777420.html (“This past Black History Month, millions of students were told the story of how America abolished slavery 150 years ago with ratification of the 13th Amendment.”).
185. ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM
36 (2004); MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM, THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF
SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 47 (2001) (as a wartime measure, slavery
would not be prohibited after the war).
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Another view is that slavery never ended. Rather, it transformed as
new means to exploit Black labor emerged, evolving perhaps several
times. 186 As I have previously stated, this reading of slavery is more complicated and likely confounding to some; after all, the Thirteenth
Amendment served as a vehicle for freedom. For example, after 1865, no
Black child in the United States could be born into slavery nor designated the property of her parents’ “master.” Even as some Black people may
have labored in the same fields as before—perhaps under the direction of
people who previously claimed ownership of them—at least from a federal policy perspective, pay was expected and often resulted. Moreover,
by the plain language of the Thirteenth Amendment, Black people who
were not convicted of crimes were “free” persons. For these reasons, the
story of slavery’s end in 1865 seems more than logical and a hopeful reading about the potential of the United States to confront its racial past and
extinguish the badges of slavery for good. After all, the goal of the 38th
Congress was to abolish slavery, even if equality could not be agreed upon. 187
The reality, however, is that Southern lawmakers contrived to suspend and undermine the new freedom accorded to the class of previously
enslaved Black people before the Thirteenth Amendment’s December
ratification. Between April 8, 1865, the date of the Senate vote, until and
even after ratification in December 1865, southern lawmakers expended
great energy innovating myriad laws and provisions to render newly freed
Black people vulnerable to the Thirteenth Amendment’s Punishment
Clause. 188 As such, the bandage of the Thirteenth Amendment was
snatched off the wounds of slavery before the scars ever healed. 189
Southern lawmakers reframed, retooled, and resuscitated slavery,
drafting a new blueprint that included designs on criminal statutes, Black
Codes, 190 and the introduction of convict renting and leasing, which
186. See generally DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008)
(discussing the growth and use of the convict lease system from the American Civil War
to World War II); Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1595, 1630 (2015) (arguing that the “new peonage,” reflects reconfiguration of the state
judicial systems in the American South, following the Civil War, which ensnared Black
people into cyclical coerced labor systems that now reemerge in the myriad ways, including through various court fines and fees.).
187. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1490 (1864).
188. EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION, 7, 31 (1875).
189. W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD A
HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO
RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1860-1880, at 128–81 (1956).
190. See, e.g., THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 41
(1965) (addressing the expansive “anti-free-Negro” legislation and extra-legal customs
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could span decades for minor offenses. These systems supplied cheap
labor to coal mines and railways and drove this expansion of slave labor
in the Southern economy. 192 According to William Warren Rogers and
Robert David Ward, the new penal codes in effect after ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment contained “infamous ‘Black Codes’ that discriminated against the newly [freed slaves], and resembled the ‘Slave Codes’ of
antebellum days.” 193 They explain,”[m]ost importantly, the new code enabled county courts to hire out vagrants, mostly blacks, to work out their
sentences,” and as a result, “[w]orking for the county became the punishment for a number of offenses.”194
Persons guilty of felonies were sent to the state penitentiary,
while the county jails housed those convicted of misdemeanors plus costs. From there the prisoners could be leased for
“hard labor” either within the county or elsewhere. The
Black Codes . . . remained an accepted and defended mode of
punishment and profit. 195
A commitment to the solidification of the racial caste system is reflected in Black Codes. According to Eric Foner, “[v]irtually all the former Confederate states enacted sweeping vagrancy and labor contract
laws, supplemented by ‘antienticement’ measures punishing anyone offering higher wages to an employee already under contract.” 196 Throughout
the south, Black Codes were common, calling for “hard labor” and fines
for what amounted to existing in southern towns. In 1876, a mere decade
following ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Georgia legislature enacted a law that authorized prison officials to lease inmates for
twenty years at the price of $500,000. 197 The law unmistakably targeted
Black people, even though it did not do so explicitly in the language of

and practices that thwarted freedom for Black people, reducing them to the status experienced before the Civil War).
191. William Andrew Todd, Convict Lease System, NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA: HISTORY
AND ARCHAEOLOGY (Dec 12, 2005), William Andrew Todd, Convict Lease System, NEW
GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA: HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY (Dec 12, 2005) [https://perma.cc
/GVJ5-H6VZ].
192. See, e.g., William Warren Rogers & Robert David Ward, The Convict Lease System
in Alabama, in THE ROLE OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
BIRMINGHAM 1 (1998).
193. Id. at 1.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 18631877, at 200-01 (1988).
197. Todd, supra note 191.
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the statute. In 1878, Georgia leased out 1,239 prisoners for labor: 1,124
were Black. 198
In Orlando, Florida, a city ordinance provided “any person or persons who shall stand or gather on any sidewalk in the city of Orlando in
such a manner as to obstruct the passage of persons along such sidewalk,
shall, upon conviction, be fined in the sum of five dollars or be imprisoned in the calaboose for five days at hard labor.” 199 Similarly, in Alabama, lawmakers made it a crime for “free negroes and mulattoes” to assemble in a disorderly manner. 200 Another Alabama code stated that Black
people employed by farmers “shall not have the right to sell any corn,
rise, [sic] peas, wheat, or other grains, any flour, cotton, fodder, hay, bacon, fresh meat of any kind, poultry of any kind, animal of any kind.”201
This law, although enacted after the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification
and the abolition of slavery, referenced “masters” in relation to Black laborers. 202
Likewise, Mississippi legislators established a series of Black Codes
associated with vagrancy. They imposed inordinate fines of $150 for the
equivalent of what today would be misdemeanor violations. 203 If the fines
could not be paid, the Mississippi codes provided that:
[A]ll fines and forfeitures collected under the provisions of this
act shall be paid into the county treasury for general county
purposes; and in case any freedman, free Negro, or mulatto
shall fail for five days after the imposition of any fine or forfeiture upon him or her for violation of any of the provisions of
this act to pay the same, that it shall be, and is hereby made,
the duty of the sheriff of the proper county to hire out said
freedman, free Negro, or mulatto to any person who will, for
the shortest period of service, pay said fine or forfeiture and all
costs. 204
Children were not spared the racial caste system. Even though they
were born free, they too could be reduced to slavery before reaching puberty. According to Douglas Blackmon, “[i]n the immediate wake of
emancipation, the Alabama legislature swiftly passed a measure under
which the orphans of freed slaves, or the children of blacks deemed inad198. Fletcher M. Green, Some Aspects of the Convict Lease System in the Southern States, 31
ESSAYS S. HIST. 120 (1949).
199. Carter v. State, 22 Fla. 553, 558 (Fla. 1886).
200. Withers v. Coyles, 36 Ala. 320, 326 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1860).
201. MCPHERSON, supra note 188, at 35.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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equate parents, were to be ‘apprenticed’ to their former masters.” Binding out children exemplified the perversely transformed apprenticeship
laws.
Children and young adults were not spared the fines, penalties, and
hard labor. In Florida, a law mandated “every free negro over twelve
years old, who should fail to have a guardian, should be fined and committed to jail until the fine should be paid.”206 This law also provided that
any person who purchased from or sold to any free “negro or mulatto”
without the written consent of the selected guardian, would be punished
with a fine. 207
Profits were made all around, including by unscrupulous prison
wardens who negotiated special deals with coal mining executives, supplying the bodies of Black teenagers who landed in prison because they
could not afford to pay fines for walking down a street or standing on a
corner. 208 The wardens would lease these children for up to 20 years—if
they survived that long—to the tycoons of the nation’s most profitable
industries. 209
The goal and result of the Punishment Clause was the retrenchment
of slavery and it did much more. Southern lawmakers curated slavery’s
expansion on southern tenant plantations. According to economist Nancy
Virts, tax records showed the number of plantations in select Louisiana
parishes increased by 286 percent between 1860 and 1880. 210 Similarly,
rather than attenuation after the abolition of slavery, southern plantations
increased in size, resulting in greater wealth production. During the early
years of Jim Crow, tenant plantations increased their size (in acreage) in
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina from 19 to
24 percent. 211
Lawmakers and local officials policed enforcement of crop liens and
innovated new slave provisions consistent with the constitutionality of

205. See DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT
OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 53 (2008).
206. Budd v. Long, 13 Fla. 288, 311 (Fla. 1869).
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Rogers & Ward, supra note 192.
209. Id. See also, BLACKMON, supra note 205, at 96–97 (“The private guards who staffed
the slave labor mines and camps were vulgar, untrained, and often inebriated. Placed under the complete control of the companies and businessmen who acquired them, the laborers suffered intense physical abuse and the deprivation of food, clothing, medical care,
and other basic human needs.”).
210. Nancy Virts, The Efficiency of Southern Tenant Plantations 1900-1945, 51 J. ECON.
HIST. 385 (1991) (citing ROGER SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA
239-41 (1966)).
211. Joseph Reid, White Land, Black Labor, and Agricultural Stagnation: The Causes and
Effects of Sharecropping in the Postbellum South, 16 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 31 (1979).
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the Thirteenth Amendment, such as lifetime labor. Debt peonage
evolved into a new form of bondage. 212 Southern lawmakers persisted in
the fomentation of a racial caste system sufficiently durable to withstand
the new constitutional provision designed to arm Black people with freedom. This speaks to their creativity in amassing odious laws. Slavery’s reinvigoration after the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification reflects the
devious means by which southern lawmakers governed and the practices
they deployed to subvert the constitutional protections newly gained by
Black people. Black Codes reflected southern lawmakers’ insincerity in
ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment.
Before ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, abolitionists rallied to the aid of enslaved Black people. They denounced policies and
practices that subjected innocent children, women, and men to the worst
physical and sexual cruelties. After the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification and inclusion of the Punishment Clause, incarcerated Black children
were convicts and criminals—far less worthy of northerners’ sympathy—
although they were no different than before.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s Punishment Clause has never been
repealed and continues to evolve. With disparate surveillance, policing,
arrests, charges, and prosecutions, Black people disproportionately experience the criminal justice system. Locked in this system, they and others
“convicted of a crime” are modern subjects to this clever southern strategy.
Conclusion
The United States incarcerates more people than any other nation
in the world. Thus, even while the cotton fields of old may no longer be
populated by Black laborers from the damp dawn to chilly dusk, other
practices reinforcing slavery persist. Today, conditions of slavery persist,
especially during COVID-19. The incarcerated “convicts” put out wildfires in California for less than two dollars per hour and sew COVID-19
masks, which they are not provided. 213 In New York, they make the

212. Roger Wallace Shugg, Survival of the Plantation System in Louisiana, 3 J.S. HIST. 311,
324 (1937) (“The subordination of freedmen to peonage” aided in the preservation of the
plantation system after the Civil War, relegating the newly emancipated and freed Blacks
into a slavery-like system).
213. Kiera Feldman, California Kept Prison Factories Open. Inmates Worked for Pennies an
Hour As COVID-19 Spread, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2020), https://www.latimes.com
/california/story/2020-10-11/california-prison-factories-inmates-covid-19.
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hand sanitizer for no, or barely any, pay. In some prisons and jails, people
receive no pay or only pennies per hour for their labor. 214
In Alabama, incarcerated people earn no pay for what are referred
to as “non-industry jobs,” although work programs facilitated by Alabama aid private industries (making couches, barbecue grills, and other
items). 215 Workers in those programs can earn $0.25 to $0.75 per hour,
according to data collected by the Prison Policy Initiative in 2017.216 The
same is true for Florida. Arkansas and Georgia don’t pay for non-industry
nor private industry jobs. 217 States that do pay for “non-industry” jobs do
so with the most meager of wages: as little as $0.10 per hour in Arizona218
or $0.04 in Louisiana. 219 Private industry jobs in these states might fetch
under $1.00 per hour.220 If this sounds like modern day slavery to you,
you are right. It is. Today, the “Punishment Clause” is what permits slavery to persist in the United States. Given the demographic patterns of
mass incarceration, the racialization of this system cannot be overlooked.
Part III: Social Caste, Social Code, and Social Distance:
Legislating Inferiority
Parts I and II tell a creation story about the law’s role in the fomenting of racial caste in the United States. Part III demonstrates how
local ordinances and state-based legislation fueled this ideology and served
as an exhilarant on an already raging fire.
Part III makes three contributions. First, it renders discernible and
visible America’s racial caste system as a legal caste ordering and problem.
Of course, law does not operate in a vacuum, nor in the absence of legal
actors, including lawyers, prosecutors, legislators, and judges. Law is not
self-enforcing, nor does it come to life on its own, independent of people
who establish, enforce, and evaluate it. Second, it challenges the idea that

214. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context, PRISON
POLICY INITIATIVE (2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html [https://perma.cc/
N6S7-42AC]
215. State and Federal Prison Wage Policies and Sourcing Information, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/wage_policies.html
[https://perma.cc/B24R-TMP].
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Lauren Castle & Maria Polleta, Some Prisoners in Arizona Make 10 Centers Per
Hour—Should They Get a $3 Minimum Wage?, AZCENTRAL (Feb. 8, 2020),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona/2020/02/07/arizona-lawmakerproposes-3-per-hour-minimum-wage-prisoners/4681453002/ [https://perma.cc/86SMRJUS].
219. State and Federal Prison Wage Policies and Sourcing Information, supra note 215.
220. Id.
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the Thirteenth Amendment permanently divested America of the badges
of slavery. Here, the contribution is not in highlighting the continued
uncompensated labor as described in Part II. Rather, it turns to the emotional and psychological indignities of slavery found in the barriers to full
and equal participation in society. Third, Part III shows how the public
and private values, principles, and ideals that normalized the kidnaping
and trafficking of Africans and later created slaves of men, women, and
children, served to rationalize racial caste post-Reconstruction to lingering and enduring effect.
In a seminal legal treatise, States’ Laws On Race and Color, Dr. Pauli
Murray, 221 a predecessor to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), placed in stark detail law’s complicity in
establishing the American racial hierarchy and its explicit ranking of racebased privileges in the post-Reconstruction Era and decades deep into
the 20th century. Exhaustively detailed, the treatise chronicles thousands
of laws and codes explicitly excluding, segregating, and subordinating
Black people based on their politically constructed race—state by state
and, in some instances, by city. 222 Collectively, discriminatory state legislation and local regulations and codes stitched together public policy on
race in the United States.
In turn, the public policy on race in the United States reinforced
and fomented new discriminatory social norms and expectations regarding racial order, including in private spheres, for which the Supreme
Court showed dismissive regard for the protections accorded Black people by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 223 In The Civil Rights
Cases, in an 8-1 opinion, the Court stated:
221. Murray herself was profoundly affected by the American racial caste system. As a
Black woman, she was denied opportunities reserved for men in law. Graduating first in
her class from Howard Law School, she was offered a prestigious fellowship at Harvard,
which later was rescinded when her sex was discovered. Murray provided key legal analyses and arguments that would later be adopted by Thurgood Marshall, the ACLU, and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in challenges before the Supreme Court to achieve both race and
sex equality. See, e.g., Pauli Murray, The Right to Equal Opportunity in Employment, 33
CAL. L. REV. 388 (1945); Kathryn Schultz, The Many Lives of Pauli Murray, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/themany-lives-of-pauli-murray [https://perma.cc/4XLH-GHZT] (describing how even as a
student at Howard Law School, Murray urged civil rights pioneers to challenge the “separate” part of Plessy v. Ferguson’s discriminatory “separate but equal” policy).
222. Thurgood Marshall famously described the Murray treatise as “the Bible for civil
rights lawyers.” See Kenya Downs, The ‘Black, Queer, Feminist’ Legal Trailblazer You’ve
Never Heard of, NPR (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/02
/19/387200033/the-black-queer-feminist-legal-trailblazer-youve-never-heard-of.
[https://perma.cc/4P7V-A2BK].
223. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 31 (1883) (“[W]hen a man has emerged from
slavery, and, by the aid of beneficent legislation, has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes
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There were thousands of free colored people in this country
before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights
of life, liberty and property the same as white citizens, yet no
one at that time thought that it was any invasion of his personal status as a freeman because he was not admitted to all the
privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because he was subjected to discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations
in inns, public conveyances and places of amusement.224
In other words, the denial of accommodations and basic dignities associated with one’s personhood simply constituted “mere discrimination.”225
And, “mere discriminations on account of race or color,” according to
the Supreme Court, “were not . . . badges of slavery” or, for that matter,
sufficiently odious to be unconstitutional.226
As such, the denial of services to Black people in the private
sphere—such as at eateries, department stores, gas stations, hotels, and
motels (by law or social preference) 227—mirrored the hostilities imposed
by the government, reflected in numerous racially discriminatory state
statutes and local regulations and codes. 228 The hostility toward Black
Americans was so ubiquitous that “Coca-Cola machines had ‘White Customers Only’ printed on them.” 229 The racial caste system—an irrational
social and legal policy—evolved into facto viam vitae, a de facto way of
life. Sadly, if white people had no particular reason to discriminate against
the rank of a mere citizen and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his
rights as a citizen or a man are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men’s rights are protected.”) (Harlan, J., dissenting) See also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S.
339, 358 (1870) (“Nothing . . . could have a greater tendency to destroy the independence and autonomy of the States; reduce them to a humiliating and degrading dependence upon the central government; engender constant irritation; and destroy that domestic tranquility which it was one of the objects of the Constitution to insure,—than the
doctrine asserted in this case, that Congress can exercise coercive authority over judicial
officers of the States in the discharge of their duties under State laws.”).
224. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Candacy Taylor, The Roots of Route 66, ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/the-roots-of-route-66/506255
[https://perma.cc/QR7E-KPGE] (“Not only were they shut out of pools and beaches,
blacks couldn’t eat, sleep, or even get gas at most white-owned businesses. To avoid the
humiliation of being turned away, they often traveled with portable toilets, bedding, gas
cans, and ice coolers.”).
228. Id. (“In 1930, 44 out of the 89 counties that lined Route 66 were all-white communities known as ‘Sundown Towns’—places that banned blacks from entering city limits after dark. Some posted signs that read, ‘Nigger, Don’t Let the Sun Set on You
Here.’”).
229. Id.
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or hold Black people in contempt, state laws and codes of the 19th and
20th centuries provided reason to do so and demanded it of them.
Murray’s treatise copiously documents race-based laws adopted by
legislatures throughout the United States. These laws included legislation
and ordinances segregating accommodations, imposing racial restrictions
in cemeteries, and prohibiting integration in schools.230 Not only did such
laws bar interracial marriages, as described in Part I, they included bans
on the interchange of textbooks between “white and colored schools”
and imposed segregation in colleges and universities, among other racially
discriminatory enactments. Local courts upheld most of these laws, and
they were legalized generally in Plessy v. Ferguson. 231 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana Act that mandated railways enforce segregated seating and accommodations. According to the Court:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the
white and colored races — a distinction which is founded in
the color of the two races, and which must always exist so
long as white men are distinguished from the other race by
color — has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the
two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.232
Legal race traps were ubiquitous, invasive, and caused suffering related to
what one could or could not do.
These laws were radical in their scope and scale. They reflected and
were in service to an essential tenet of the racial caste system—the deployment of rigid social stratification defining restrictions where people
ate, lived, how they traveled, enjoyed entertainment, social recreation,
and more. Even if white people desired building relationships with Black
colleagues, friends, or relatives, under state and local statutory provisions
and codes, they were prohibited from doing so. State and local lawmakers precluded the probabilities of “race-mixing” in nearly every possibility, except in Black people’s service to white people in their states, cities,
and towns.
The laws were comprehensively drawn and so highly detailed that,
upon reading a few or hundreds, their explicit and implicit aims to preserve and advance white supremacy, reinforce racial stratification and
race-based hierarchy, impede interracial connection and intimacy, and
create nearly impenetrable barriers to Black peoples’ ability to overcome
the vestiges of slavery, are inescapably clear. Moreover, even if not ex230. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 125.
231. Id. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1879) (holding that an indictment against a State officer for excluding Black
people from the jury list is sustainable).
232. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543.
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plicitly drawn in such statutes and codes, these rules inherently sowed
suspicion in the despised class. After all, why would lawmakers go to such
lengths to protect white people from exposure to Black people? For years, these
laws were perceived as race-neutral, constitutional, and therefore invulnerable to legal challenge, largely based on prior Supreme Court jurisprudence. 233
Local, race-exclusionary ordinances included language barring white
people from certain activities such as living in Black neighborhoods and
imposed similar restraints on “negros.” Lawmakers could stave off criticism by pointing to their codes as not denying Black people’s ability to
ride a local bus; they simply demarcated where the seating could be. Officials could and did argue that they did not deny an education to Black
children, rather students learned among their racial kind. 234 Legal challenges to these laws were futile. The centuries-long dignity harms inflicted on Black people had largely not been vindicated in courts, particularly
the Supreme Court. 235
A cursory examination of local ordinances brings the dignity concerns, harms, and evidence of inequality forward. For example, in Atlanta, Georgia, it was illegal for Black barbers to serve “white women or
girls.” 236 A violation of the law was punishable by a “fine not exceeding
$200, or sentence[] to work on the public works of the city.” 237 The law
left it to the discretion of the local magistrate to impose one or both of
the punishments.
A cursory examination of local laws shows the effort and interest of
local officials to import and impart the inferiority of Black Americans into
law. These ordinances also tell the story of the incessant effort to maintain racial hierarchy by means of law in the United States. These laws
mirrored others in cities and towns across the nation. These laws showed
a preoccupation with Black people throughout their lives, and through
discriminatory burial policies, the racial caste system even followed them
to death. The ordinances were vast in scale and scope. This brief sampling represents a broad set of restrictions intended to reinforce America’s
enduring racial caste system.
A. Dining
In Birmingham, Alabama, it was
233. Id. at 551–52.
234. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
235. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551–52 (1896) (stating racially restrictive laws “do[] not conflict
with the Thirteenth Amendment”); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
236. MURRAY, supra note 125, at 627.
237. Id.
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unlawful to conduct a restaurant or other place serving of food
in the city, at which white and colored people are served in
the same room, unless such white and colored persons are effectually separated by a solid partition extending from the
floor upward to a distance of seven feet or higher.238
Similarly, in Atlanta, Georgia, an ordinance required drastic separate seating accomodations for white and “colored” people; according to the ordinance,
All persons licensed to conduct a restaurant, shall serve either
white people exclusively or colored people exclusively and
shall not sell to the two races within the same room or serve
the two races anywhere under the same license; the purpose of
this section being that each licensee shall serve either one race
or the other and that no license shall authorize sale to the two
races at or near the same place. 239
To advance these policies, the iconic signs “for white people only” were
mandated, created, and posted. 240
B. Housing
In New Orleans, Louisiana, a local ordinance prohibited “white
persons from establishing a home residence in a negro community.” 241 It
was also illegal for a city engineer to give a building permit to anyone
building a house in a white community that would be occupied by a
Black person. 242 Discriminatory laws were justified on the basis that they
reflected local custom. Pointing to this, a Birmingham code adopted in
1949 related to housing segregation stated, “from the date of the original
settlement of this City unto the present time it has been the invariable
custom, supported for most of that time by municipal law and universally
observed . . . to require white and colored residents to live in separate
residential areas.”243

238. Id. at 615.
239. Id. at 627.
240. Id. (In another section of the same ordinance, Section 53-604, the city of Atlanta
required “[t]he Clerk of the Council in issuing licenses for restaurants shall designate
therein the character of the trade authorized to be served under such license, as ‘for white
people only’ or ‘for colored people only.’”).
241. Id. at 634.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 617.
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However, local governments also appealed to fear. Again, in Birmingham, to further legitimize their racially discriminatory laws, local officials established a commission to review its policies. Among its findings,
the commission claimed that when white people or Black people established permanent residency among each other, the results were “violence,
disturbances of the peace, destruction of property and life . . . almost
without exception.”244 The commission’s ordinance provides no evidence
of such violence, certainly none of Black people harming white people as
neighbors.
What history does show is that Alabama had long been cruel in its
regard for Black lives. Alabama stands out in a prior work examining the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Punishment clause, and postReconstruction Black Codes. 245 Alabama lawmakers made it punishable
for “free negroes and mulattoes” to assemble in a disorderly manner.246
Yet another Alabama Black Code made it “unlawful for any freedman,
mulatto, or free person of color in [Alabama] to own fire-arms, or carry
about his person a pistol or other deadly weapon under a penalty of a fine
of $100.” 247 Speaking directly to questions of violence and punishment, it
was the state that had (prior to the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment) permitted the whipping and branding of Black people. The state
announced a change, enacting “[w]hipping and branding are abolished, as
legal punishments, and a new punishment is introduced entitled, ‘hard
labor for the county.’”248 Alabama’s restrictions on Black people were exhaustive, constraining, denying, and interfering with all manner of freedoms associated with employment, education, housing, sex, family, freedom of association, farming, possessing paperwork to farm and sell goods,
and more.
Placing in context Alabama’s 1949 ordinance barring interracial
housing based on claims of violence, the commission did get one thing
right: Black residents commonly regarded Birmingham as “bombingham”
for the nightmarish assaults on their lives, their children’s lives, and on
their places of worship. 249 A Birmingham periodical chronicled some of
the horrors inflicted on Black communities through photography. 250 As
the accompanying text to their virtual gallery notes, “[v]iolent racists in
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 30.
246. Withers v. Coyles, 36 Ala. 320, 326 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1860).
247. MCPHERSON, supra note 188, at 7, 33 (1875).
248. Id. at 34.
249. Glenn T. Eskew, “Bombingham”: Black Protest in Postwar Birmingham, Alabama, 59
HISTORIAN 371, 373 (1997).
250. See, e.g., Jeremy Gray, Bombingham: Racist Bombings Captured in Chilling Photos,
AL.COM (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.al.com/news/erry-2018/07/f39190a3553390
/bombingham.html [https://perma.cc/4W9B-FJYK].
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the late 1940s voiced their disapproval with shouts of dynamite, shattering windows, splintering homes and churches, and, in the course of
20 years, turning the Smithfield neighborhood into ‘Dynamite Hill’
251
and the Magic City into ‘Bombingham.’”
Rather than seriously investigating, pursuing leads, and charging
suspects, local officials failed to protect those harmed by racist violence
and left Black families and religious leaders essentially on their own.
With such negligent or purposefully unavailing leadership to protect its
Black citizens, white individuals and mobs used dynamite as a means of
inflicting terror and fear in Black communities. An original caption to
a 1948 bombing reads, “Here is the interior of the house at 1100 Center Street, showing effects of the dynamite blast early today on the
transom and front porch of the home.” 252 Another caption from 1949
reads, “Birmingham Alabama Smithfield Bombing, 1949. Back Porch
was Here: A police officer surveyed damage to one of three homes that
were blasted in an after-midnight explosion in the North Smithfield
section. The back porch was blown off the house.” 253 Such news headlines were common in Birmingham. 254
A familiar feature of such violence was that law enforcement did
very little to either protect the lives of Black people or to bring to justice those who committed such crimes. In the 1960s, the world viewed
the aftermath of how far white supremacy reached in threatening the
lives of Birmingham’s Black residents as four little girls were killed and
numerous others maimed, permanently paralyzed, rendered blind, and
otherwise injured at the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham. 255
C. Transportation
In reviewing archives of race-based discriminatory laws, it is evident
that local governments concentrated significant energy on enacting laws
related to transportation by taxis, buses, railways, and cars for hire. In
Dallas, Houston, Birmingham, Mobile, New Orleans, and elsewhere, local governments commonly mandated restrictive and discriminatory
transportation laws. Penalties and fines as punishment for violating the
ordinances were common. 256 Some clauses directly involved the police,
obligating them to enforce the segregation policy.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See 1881 Tenn. Pub. Acts 211–12 (imposing a fine for refusing segregated accommodations in railway cars); 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 132–33 (same); 1890 La. Acts 152
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In Jacksonville, Florida, it was illegal for Black people and white
people to take taxis together. 257 An ordinance mandated that “any police
officer” observing individuals violating the law “shall arrest any such person and take him or her from such car and carry him or her to the police
station as in case of any other person guilty of disorderly conduct.”258
Similarly, in Atlanta, it was the “duty of police” to “give special attention” to racial segregation in street cars and “arrest . . . person so violating said laws.”259 Birmingham, Alabama required that any business or
operator of a taxicab, jitney, or bus in the city accommodate white people and Black people with separate vehicles or “by clearly indicating or
designating by visible markers the area to be occupied by each race in any
vehicle in which the two races are permitted to be carried together and
by confining each race to occupancy of the area of such vehicle so set
apart for it.” 260
D. Recreation
In Birmingham, Alabama, a city ordinance barred “any room hall,
theatre, picture house, auditorium, yard, court, ball park, public park, or
other indoor or outdoor place” from permitting any “theatrical performance, picture exhibition, speech, or educational or entertainment program of any kind whatsoever, unless such” facility had entrances and exits, seating and standing sections “set aside for and assigned to the use of
white persons” and that were “distinctly separated” from any that may
exist for “the use of negroes.” 261 The ordinance mandated the use of
“well defined physical barriers” to exclude contact between white people
and Black people.262
Birmingham also enacted an ordinance titled, “Negroes and White
Persons Not to Play Together.”263 This regulation pertained to gambling,
pool and billiard rooms, and bowling alleys.264 The ordinance made it a
crime “for a negro and white person to play together or in company with

(same); 1891 Ala. Laws 412 (same); 1904 Md. Laws 186–87 (same); 1904 S.C. Acts 438–
39 (imposing a fine for refusing segregated accommodations in a ferry); 1905 Fla. Laws
99–100 (imposing a fine for refusing segregated accommodations in a streetcar).
257. MURRAY, supra note 125, at 625.
258. Id. at 625.
259. Id. at 629.
260. Id. at 616–617.
261. Id. at 615.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 615–616.
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each other in any game of cards or dice, dominoes or checkers.” Persons caught violating this regulation could be fined $100 or imprisoned in
“the local jail, workhouse, or house of correction or at hard labor” for up
to 6 months, “or both fine and imprisonment.”266 Not only were the participants subject to criminal punishment for violating the law, but so too
were the owners of such establishments permitting Black people and
white people to play together.
Similarly, restrictions were enacted in other cities. In Houston,
Texas, city council members established Emancipation Park for Black
people. In the same code granting Black people the use of a park with a
symbolic name, the local government established that “all other parks in
the city now or hereafter existing . . . shall be used exclusively by white
people.” 267
Conclusion
Lawmakers craftily baked white supremacy into local ordinances
throughout the United States. These laws prioritized pleasure, comfort,
and safety for white Americans. In Dallas, Texas, these codes barred
Black people from the freedoms to which white people were entitled,
applying to “any person of African descent or any person who has any
negro blood in his veins of whatsoever quantity.” 268 Quite possible, if not
likely, state and local lawmakers bent on legalizing white supremacy and
racism drafted legislation and local ordinances with the Plessy precedent as
their blueprint.
By denying basic needs, accommodations, and comforts to Black
citizens, lawmakers weaponized the law for a discriminatory agenda,
spanning centuries. States collected tax revenue from Black Americans,
yet denied them access to the public spaces their tax dollars subsidized,
including parks, swimming pools, and other outdoor facilities. Their tax
payments contributed to the bricks and mortar for schools that would ultimately serve only white students and deny Black children admission.
This corruption—local officials extracting resources from Black
Americans to fund spaces and services exclusively to benefit white people—was yet another, perverse vestige of slavery; Black people laboring
and contributing to luxuries they could not enjoy. Individually, any one
such restrictive law, denying where one might live, eat, or sleep perpetrated a terrible offense on a class of people. Collectively, these policies
showed disdain for the constitutional equality of Black people.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 616.
Id.
Id. at 662.
Id..
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Part IV: Racial Caste and The Familiar
Of all the races and varieties of men which have suffered from
this feeling, the colored people of this country have endured
most. They can resort to no disguises which will enable them
to escape its deadly aim. They carry in front the evidence
which marks them for persecution. They stand at the extreme
point of difference from the Caucasian race, and their African
origin can be instantly recognized, though they may be several
removes from the typical African race. They may remonstrate
like Shylock . . . – Frederick Douglass 269
Thus far, this Article tells a story about racial caste and hierarchy
embedded in law, texts, policies, and positions. As stated earlier, law does
not operate in a vacuum, nor is it shaped absent legal actors: judges, politicians, prosecutors, and advocates. Indeed, since the first ships transporting African slaves arrived in what would become the United States, numerous lawmakers, judges, and others were complicit in demarking racial
boundaries. However, they are not the point of this Article. This Article’s
purposeful focus on laws is to demonstrate that the power of racial hierarchy and caste in the United States are systemic, rooted in institutions
and infrastructures rather than individuals.
As such, this Article has argued that law created racial caste in the
United States. Parts I and II articulated that this process began during the
period of Antebellum slavery through the enactment of specific laws and
adoption of practices and policies that safeguarded human kidnapping,
trafficing, and the denial of personhood to the Africans subjected to such
conditions. At the time of the nation’s founding, “slavery was legal in
every state in the Union.” 270 Even though the Thirteenth Amendment
was designed to lift Black people from the vestiges of slavery, it was not
intended to confer equality. Nor did it. Rather than abolishing racial
caste, the Thirteenth Amendment’s Punishment Clause further instantiated it. Part III demonstrated the enduring power of legislation to advance
racial caste in the United States.
Parts I through III tell a story about the weaponization of law to
achieve and fuel the racial caste system in the United States. Part IV turns
to the effects of law, providing a cursory surfacing of traumas produced
by racial caste. It takes up the challenge to illume the past as a means of

269. Frederick Douglass, The Color Line, 132 NORTH AM. REV. 567, 568 (1881).
270. Patrick Rael, The Distinction Between Slavery and Race in U.S. History, BLACK
PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 27, 2016), https://www.aaihs.org/the-distinction-between-slaveryand-race-in-u-s-history/.
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shaping viable, credible pathways for meaningful equality in the future.
Subpart A of the Article briefly considers arguments that offer a different
origin story than racial caste—one rooted in raw expressions of power
associated with capitalism, furthering religious ideology, or the preservation of whiteness rather than anti-Blackness. Subpart B briefly excavates
examples of the hidden, largely overlooked effects of racial caste. In closing, Part C advocates for continued investment in reckoning with racial
caste and the lessons that might be drawn from it.
A. Caste, Tolerance, and Intolerance: Origin Stories
Lawmakers founded America’s racial caste system or “raceselfishness” on ideologies of exclusion versus inclusion. 271 In 1897, President Roosevelt wrote, “democracy, with the clear instinct of race selfishness, saw the race foe, and kept out the dangerous alien.” 272 The ideology
of white supremacy and racial hierarchy operated within and without,
drawing internal as well as external boundaries. The vestiges of nationalism survive today in immigration policy.
Castes rely on hierarchy and exclusion, the exaltation and privileging of those at the top and the subordination and often stereotyping of
those at the bottom. The enslavement of Black people is foundational to
the history of racial caste in the United States. However, overlapping histories and theories as well as temporal political battles both internally and
externally problematize this history. For example, some scholars claim
that slavery had very little to do with race in its beginnings. Others claim
that religion was the key distinction, determining who would and would
not be enslaved in the colonies and later states. Another view suggests
that racial caste, during eugenics, centered on white Americans and had
little to do with Black people. The deployment of science in service of
racism and exclusionary policies, including forced sterilization and immigration bans in the late 19th century and for decades forward, undermines the latter proposition.
Given this history, three lines of thought are acknowledged and
briefly addressed here.
271. Pankaj Mishra, The Religion of Whiteness Becomes A Suicide Cult, NY TIMES:
OPINION (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/opinion/race-politicswhiteness.html (explaining “It is in the motherlands of democracy rather than in fascist
Europe that racial hierarchies first defined the modern world. It is also where a last-ditch
and potentially calamitous battle to preserve them is being fought today.”) Nor was this
an enterprise exclusive to the United States. In Canada, the Toronto League for Race
Betterment, was part of a movement that employed “ethnic, nativist, and racist labels,”
which “occasioned little public comment.” See ANGUS MCLAREN, OUR OWN MASTER
RACE: EUGENICS IN CANADA 1885-1945 (1990).
272. Id.
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1. Theories of Caste and Slavery: Slavery Had Nothing to Do with Race
First, there is the provocative theory that slavery had nothing or
very little to do with race. In other words, the foundation of racial caste
in the United States—slavery—was not even race-based. This view suggests that “slavery divided the nation; race not so much.”273
Specifically, if one considers the literal meaning of James Madison’s
reflections on the Constitutional Convention, the most heated debates
were about slavery, but race played no part. 274 According to Patrick Rael,
“The framers of the Constitution debated slavery, but not race.” 275 He
writes, “As James Madison noted, of all the divides between the states,
the one that came to drive debates most was that between slave states and
those becoming free. . . . They were about the political power of slaveholders, not the rights of those enslaved or degraded by the racial identity
ascribed to them.” 276
There are two ways to interpret this theory. The first is that slavery
was about galvanizing power, expanding capitalism, and safeguarding the
system by securing it in the hands of elite white men. The source of human chattel mattered very little. Hence, the chattel’s race was inconsequential to the pursuit of power, wealth, economic stability, and the
growth of slavery. Another branch of this argument (that slavery was not
about race, but rather power) is that “[w]idespread consensus consigned
nearly all blacks to sub-citizen status, even when they were not legal
property.” 277 In other words, the inequality of Black people was a foregone
conclusion, whether they were enslaved or not. As such, even while Black
people were as “important in building northern cities such as New York
as they were in producing the cash crops on which the southern economy depended,” they were not as important to the debates about their
lives as matters of taxation and statehood.278
Further, for some northern lawmakers, dissolving the nation’s reliance on slavery seemed inevitable well before the Civil War. The question
was how? Should the offspring of enslaved Black women be born free? Obtain
freedom at eighteen or twenty-one years of age? Scholars such as Henry Hartog
and James Gigantino refer to this as an “in-between status” for Blacks living in the North—not quite free, and not quite enslaved. 279 The gradual

273. Rael, supra note 270.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See generally JAMES GIGANTINO, THE RAGGED ROAD TO ABOLITION: SLAVERY
AND FREEDOM IN NEW JERSEY, 1775-1865 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015);
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abolition law of New Jersey, the last enacted by a state, provided that
children born to enslaved mothers after July 4, 1804 would obtain emancipation on their twenty-fifth birthday for men and twenty-first birthday
for women. 280 Scholars debate whether such efforts were motivated by
concerns related to race or simply that slavery no longer benefited the
broader political interests and concerns of wealthy elites.
Even if one were to give weight to the view that slavery could exist
as a political question without any meaning related to race, history begs a
different conclusion both in the North and South. Even as evolved notions of equality emerged among white citizens—for example, voting enfranchisement in the North no longer depended on property ownership—states that adopted such laws excluded “free” Blacks from voting.281
They qualified these laws by explicitly stating that the new voting rights
applied only to “white” qualified voters. 282 As a result, Black people were
removed “from the electorate where some had once held franchises. All
new free states entering the Union before the Civil War did so without
property qualifications for voting, but with explicit constitutional denials
of black suffrage.” 283 In New Jersey, even after adopting a “gradual emancipation” law, the state enacted a law “to establish the presumption that
black people were slaves unless proven free.”284
2. Theories of Caste and Slavery: Religion Determined Social and Legal
Status—Not Race
A second line of thought is that enslavement had as much or more
285
to do with religion than race. According to an important line of research, an original dividing line considered by early white settlers and
HENDRIK HARTOG, THE TROUBLE WITH MINNA: A CASE OF SLAVERY AND
EMANCIPATION IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH (2018); see also Andrew Diemer, The Trouble with Minna: A Case of Slavery and Emancipation in the Antebellum North, 20 CIV. WAR
BOOK REV., Summer 2018, at 1.
280. An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery, 1804 N.J. LAWS 252–53, § 1.
281. See, e.g., Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41
STAN. L. REV. 335, 353 & n.58 (1989) (In the 1820s, many states, including New York,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey, held conventions in which they replaced property ownership suffrage requirements with taxpaying qualifications or white manhood suffrage.).
282. Id.
283. Rael, supra note 270 (“Ohio (1803), Indiana (1816), Illinois (1818), Michigan
(1837), Iowa (1846), Wisconsin (1848), California (1850), and Oregon (1859). It was as if
whites regardless of class could be welcome in the new America, but only with the sacrifice of blacks’ claim on citizenship. Freedom was a great idea; it was just going to be reserved for white people.”).
284. Diemer, supra note 279.
285. MAROUF ARIF HASIAN, JR., THE RHETORIC OF EUGENICS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
THOUGHT 93-94 (1996).
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lawmakers measured Christianity and not skin color. This informed
who could be relegated to the conditions of enslavement and who was
protected against the possibility of human bondage. Religious considerations marked the boundaries of enslavement in England and its colonies. 287 Thus, in 1677, in Butts v. Penny, the Court of the Kings Bench
ruled that enslaved Blacks were subject to the rules of merchandise because they were “infidels” and could be considered property for purposes
of their owners claiming trover. 288 Similar decisions were reached in Lowe
v. Elton 289 that same year and later in Gelly v. Cleve. 290 In the latter case,
the court held that because the enslaved boy was a “heathen,” enslavement and recovery for trover were permissible.291 That is, religious differences served to designate enslaved persons, but when “a small number of
free black Christians began to claim political authority, slave owners
adapted—they introduced a new language of exclusion based on ‘whiteness’ rather than Christian status.” 292
For example, “[t]he New England colonies, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland were conceived and established ‘as plantations of religion.’” 293 Kenneth C. Davis writes, “[f]rom the earliest arrival of Europeans on America’s shores, religion has often been a cudgel, used to
discriminate, suppress and even kill the foreign, the ‘heretic’ and the ‘unbeliever’—including the ‘heathen’ natives already here.” 294 Intense,
pitched battles between colonists of various Protestant sects and Catholics
286. Katharine Gerbner, Conversion and Race In Colonial Slavery, Immanent Frame, SOC.
SCI. RES. COUNCIL (June 26, 2018), https://tif.ssrc.org/2018/06/26/conversion-and-racein-colonial-slavery/ [https://perma.cc/W2JN-AAHV].
287. Accordingly, “In 1667, the last of the religious conditions that placed limits on servitude was erased by another Virginia law. This new law deemed it legal to keep enslaved
people in bondage even if they converted to Christianity. With this decree, the justification for black servitude changed from a religious status to a designation based on race.”
Historical Foundations Of Race, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AFRICAN AM. HIST. & CULTURE,
https://nmaahc.si.edu/learn/talking-about-race/topics/historical-foundations-race
[https://perma.cc/4YAD-TPQX] (last visited Nov. 27, 2020).
288. Butts v Penny, (1677) 2 Lev. 201, 3 Keb. 785.
289. See JOHN BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 513 (1971) (discussing Lowe v. Elton (1677)).
290. Gelly v. Cleve, 91 Eng. Rep. 994 (1694).
291. Id.; see also BAKER, supra note 289 at 513 (“The courts held in the seventeenth
century that trover would lie for negroes, as if they were chattels, apparently on the
ground that they were infidels.”).
292. See Gerbner, supra note 286.
293. Religion and the Founding of the American Republic, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel01.html [https://perma.cc/T72G-7XVS].
294. Kenneth C. Davis, America’s True History of Religious Tolerance, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Oct.
2010),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/americas-true-history-ofreligious-tolerance-61312684/ [https://perma.cc/HU4L-6T8R] (last visited Nov. 28,
2020).
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served as an example of the force surrounding religion in forming colonies and organizing states. Davis writes, “[w]hile it is true that the vast
majority of early-generation Americans were Christian, the pitched battles between various Protestant sects and, more explosively, between
Protestants and Catholics, present an unavoidable contradiction to the
widely held notion that America is a ‘Christian nation.’”295
The argument is that Christianity mattered more than race at the
founding. A Protestant orthodoxy reigned throughout the colonies and
elitism or rank in society aligned according to religion rather than race.
Accordingly, enslaved Africans had no rights that white people were
bound or obligated to respect because of their religious identity rather than
their race. This view centers on religious intolerance as evidenced through
persecutions dating back to the 1600s. For example, “[p]uritans expelled
dissenters from their colonies.” 296 Quakers were executed, including
Mary Dyer. 297 She was hanged on June 1, 1660, in response to her
preaching about Quaker principles. 298 There were also extreme punishments associated with blasphemy, breaking sabbath, and being accused of
heretical conduct. 299
Susan Juster writes about the case of Charles Arabella who, after
spilling scalding fluid on his feet, called out, “[B]y God,” resulting in a
conviction for committing blasphemy. 300 British colonies regarded blasphemy as a crime of moral turpitude, and as such, it was a capital offense.
In this case, “the court mercifully ordered him to be ‘bored through his
tongue and fined . . . .’ instead of sentencing him to death.” 301 He remained in prison for six months and his tongue was bored through three
times. 302 Given this history, another view of the racial caste system in the
United States—or at least its origins—is that religion served as the original caste system. People were sorted based on religion and not race.
Yet, even if the origins of caste in the United States were rooted in
religious caste or Christian caste, ultimately race became its organizing
principle. When enslaved Black people sought conversion or baptism, a
295. Id.
296. Religion and the Founding of the American Republic, LIBR. OF CONGR.,
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel01-2.html [https://perma.cc/H5SL-2TL4] (last
visited Nov. 28, 2020).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., Susan Juster, Heretics, Blasphemers, and Sabbath Breakers: The Prosecution of
Religious Crime in Early America, in CHRIS BENEKE AND CHRISTOPHER S. GRENDA, THE
FIRST PREJUDICE: RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND INTOLERANCE IN EARLY AMERICA 12342 (2011).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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quandary manifested for Christian white slaveholders—and ultimately for
the broader institution of slavery. If conversion meant freedom, enslaved
Africans could quickly request baptism and release from bondage, thereby
undermining the foundations of slavery. Already, debate ensued regarding
whether baptized Black people would be enslaved for life or some shorter
period. A law that provided for the latter was repealed, because it threatened to negatively impact the slave trade. 303
In Chamberlain v. Harvey, a slaveholder defended his ownership of a
baptized Black man, arguing, “Who would squeeze the sugar from the
cane once all slaves had been sprinkled with holy water?” 304 According to
historian Marcus W. Jernegan:
At any rate there arose in the minds of many American colonists the notion that under English law a baptized slave might
claim freedom. Conscientious masters thus found themselves
in a dilemma: to deny conversion and baptism would retard
Christianization; to favor it might cause them the loss of their
property. To avoid this dilemma, some of the colonial assemblies altered the religious sanction for slavery and based its validity frankly upon race. While positively denying that conversion or baptism was a sufficient reason for enfranchisement
and insisting that all slaves must serve for life . . . .305
Colonies resolved this religious conundrum by embracing racial caste and
ignoring caste based on religion. For example, “between 1664 and 1706
at least six colonies passed acts affirming” that enslaved persons would
serve for life. 306 In 1664, Maryland “declared that all slaves must serve for
life in order to prevent damage which masters might sustain if their slaves
pretended to be Christians and so pleaded the law of England.” 307 Several
years later, Maryland updated its laws to clarify that conversion or baptism either before enslavement or after should never “be a cause for manumission.” 308 Similarly, a 1677 Virginia law “declared that slaves by birth
were not freed when baptized.” 309 Thus, even if enslaved Black people

303. Id. at 507 (“It is clear, however, that the assemblies in colonies where slaves were
most numerous were anxious to remove the doubt respecting the effect of baptism, and at
the same time encourage the conversion of slaves.”).
304. Chamberlain v. Harvey, 91 Eng. Rep. 994 (1696).
305. Marcus W. Jernegan, Slavery and Conversion in the American Colonies, 21 AM. HIST.
REV. 504, 506 (1916).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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converted to Christianity, they could not climb out of the bowels of slavery.
3. Theories of Caste and Slavery: Scientific Racism, Not Race-Racism
A third view of caste in the United States centers on eugenics. Even
st
in the 21 century, claims that race is biologically determined persist. In
the wake of COVID-19, some pundits query whether the disease manifests in Blacks and Latinx communities at disproportionate rates because
of their genetics. Such arguments ignore the political and social constructions of race in the United States and reinscribe—intentionally or not—
the historic views that race is biologically determined. As such—
according to this line of argument—Blacks are inherently inferior in
health and much else because of their genes. Such thinking absolves legal
and political institutions from setting the conditions that predetermine
health, wealth, and personhood.
This view starts from the premise that racial exclusion was not
about the descendants of Africans per se. Race at the turn of the 20th century included dozens of categories of white people as well as Asian,
Black, and Indigenous Populations. This view of race hierarchy—at least
as it relates to the earliest decades of the 20th century and eugenics—is
that southern elite whites were more concerned about poor white people
“polluting” their gene pools than a race-based caste system based on skin
color. 310
Rather, in 1883, Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, advocated that societies should be organized by policies promoting “fitness”
and betterment of the collective human race. 311 This new science, which
he termed eugenics, would promote “improving a human population by
controlled breeding to increase the occurrence of desirable heritable characteristics.” 312 Accordingly, reproduction should be arranged with models
similar to animal breeding. That is, European and United States policy

310. What researchers who follow this line of thought have given less consideration to
are the ways in which poor white people proved less useful to the Southern aristocracy in
the years following the abolition of slavery. Legislation and local ordinances suggest that
maintaining white supremacy remained important. Eugenics and sterilizing poor white
people were not inconsistent with racial caste. The two were mutually supporting. See,
e.g., EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 138
(1995) (“Except for the shade of scientific racism that had always darkened the eugenics
movement, Georgia’s belated sterilization campaign did not display a particularly racist
color.”).
311. See, e.g., Steven A. Farber, U.S. Scientists’ Role in the Eugenics Movement (19071939): A Contemporary Biologist’s Perspective, 5 ZEBRAFISH 243 (2008).
312. Eugenics, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 584 (2001).
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should promote arranged reproduction that increases the occurrence of
heritable characteristics regarded as desirable. 313
Galton encouraged leaders in Europe and the United States to provide economic and other incentives to support policies that encouraged
selective marriages and breeding to weed out undesirable genetic traits
and people. 314 Political and economic leaders, “Alexander Graham Bell,
Winston Churchill, John Maynard Keynes, and Woodrow Wilson”
among them, “accepted the notion that modern societies, as a matter of
policy should promote the improvement of the human race through various forms of governmental intervention, 315 which included compulsory
sterilization. In the United States, leaders embraced and implemented eugenics policies before they were adopted by the Nazis and Adolf Hitler.316
This version of caste—eugenics—also referred to as “scientific racism,” spurred states throughout the United States to enact laws that provided for the removal of people perceived as socially, mentally, or physically unfit from the broader society. 317 Homelessness, addiction, poverty,
promiscuity, and out-of-wedlock births constituted proof of “unfitness”
in states throughout the United States. 318 Identification as suffering from
one of these conditions could, and too frequently did, result in civil or
criminal incarceration or psychiatric institutionalization in state-run asylums. 319 Carrie Buck, the indigent, unsuccessful petitioner in Buck v.
Bell, 320 was confined to such an institution. States justified incarceration
and forced sterilization of girls, boys, men, and women as a sound strategy to protect the welfare of its citizens from the perceived degeneracy

313. Farber, supra note 311, at 243.
314. See, e.g., FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT (Gaven Tredox ed., 2004) (1883).
315. Id. (“While initially this desire was manifested as the promotion of selective breeding, it ultimately contributed to the intellectual underpinnings of state-sponsored discrimination, forced sterilization, and genocide.”).
316. See generally PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES:
EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (2008).
317. See generally Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ???
Are Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 191, 205, 216 (2003); Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine,
Eugenics, and the Supreme Court, From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive Freedom, 13 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 2–5 (1996).
318. See generally PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES:
EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (2008); see also Paul A. Lombardo,
Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 57, 60-61
(2008).
319. Id.; see also Melanie Fong & Larry O. Johnson, The Eugenics Movement: Some Insight
into the Institutionalization of Racism, 9 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1974).
.
320 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205–08 (1927).
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rampant among the lower classes. Tens of thousands of poor white
Americans were sterilized against their will.321
Given this, some scholars argue that eugenics or scientific caste had
more to do with intra-racial concerns than extra-racial considerations322
with Christianity serving as a primary, galvanizing force. 323 Edward Larson quotes southern white physicians who claimed, “[t]he South’s ‘poor
white trash,’ . . . is no doubt the product of the physical and mental unfit,
left in the wake of the War Between the States,” and another who advised a colleague that white people with certain “hereditary traits ought
not to be allowed to get married, and men who persist in [degenerate
behavior] ought to be confined in reformatory . . . or have their testicles
removed, so that it would be impossible for them to propagate.”324 Larson
suggests that the leading concern during post Reconstruction was “the
deterioration of the Caucasian race.” 325 By comparison, he argues this focus on the degeneracy of poor white people was a political preoccupation
that worried lawmakers far more than a “threat from the African race.” 326
Discussions and debates about eugenics have intensified in recent
years in the wake of genomic research and given advancements in reproductive technologies, but far less attention has been paid to religious leaders who were instrumental in shaping the 20th century eugenics agenda. 327 According to Graham Baker, the American Eugenics Society “de“developed its outreach to groups of particular eugenic significance by
organizing committees dedicated to ‘cooperation’ with . . . ‘Clergymen’.

321. See generally LOMBARDO, supra note 316.
322. See, e.g., EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP
SOUTH 138 (1995).
323. See, e.g., CHRISTINE ROSEN, PREACHING EUGENICS: RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND
THE AM. EUGENICS MOVEMENT (2004).
324. See e.g., LARSON, Supra note 322.
325. Id..
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., CHRISTINE ROSEN, PREACHING EUGENICS: RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND
THE AM. EUGENICS MOVEMENT (2004); see, e.g., LARSON, supra note 322 at 2 (arguing
that the leading concern post Reconstruction was “the deterioration of the Caucasian race
than about any threat from the African race”); According to Graham Baker, the American
Eugenics Society “developed its outreach to groups of particular eugenic significance by
organizing committees dedicated to ‘cooperation’ with . . . ‘Clergymen’. Alongside these
groups there were committees organised around matters of strategy and policy, for example ‘selective immigration’. . . .” Graham J. Baker, Christianity and Eugenics: The Place of
Religion in the British Eugenics Education Society and the American Eugenics Society, c. 19071940, 27 SOC. HIST. MED. 281, 294 (2014) [hereinafter Baker, Christianity and Eugenics];
Jerry Bergman, The Church Preaches Eugenics: A History of Church Support for Darwinism and
Eugenics, 20 J. CREATION 54, 58 (2006).
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Alongside these groups there were committees organized around matters
of strategy and policy, for example ‘selective immigration’. . . .”328
Finally, even while legislatures and courts constructed the guardrails
of white citizenship and reproduction, including implementing horrific
eugenics platforms, Black and indigenous people were not excluded. A
1977 report prepared by the United Nations estimated that 24 percent of
Native American women had been sterilized. 329 This was carried out
through various means. For example, the U.S. Indian Health Service
adopted policies whereby they enforced compulsory sterilizations:
The U.S. Indian Health Service (IHS) later applied forced
sterilization to American Indian women in the 1960s and
1970s, sterilizing 3,406 Native American women between
1973 and 1976. In 1976, the U.S. General Accounting Office
admitted that this took place in at least four of the 12 Indian
Health Service regions. The numbers include women in Minnesota as well as 36 women under age 21, despite a courtordered moratorium on sterilizations of women younger than
21. 330
Black communities suffered a similar fate. Forced sterilization would become so common and targeted at little girls that it became known as the
“Mississippi Appendectomy,” as one third of the practices targeted girls
under eighteen years old.331
4. Theories of Caste and Slavery: Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness
The foregoing theories of caste in the United States offer important
historical reference points and guides on intolerance, class, and religion.
328. Baker, Christianity and Eugenics, supra note 327; Bergman, supra note 327.
329. G.A. Res. 260 (a)(II), The U.N. Convention on War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, Including Genocide (Dec. 9, 1948), http://freedomarchives.org/Documents
/Finder/DOC44_scans/44.monograph.NASC.systematic.genocide.native.June.1977.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6N5Q-J48H].
330. Ellen Kennedy, On Indigenous Peoples Day, Recalling Forced Sterilizations of Native
American Women, MINNPOST (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.minnpost.com/communityvoices/2019/10/on-indigenous-peoples-day-recalling-forced-sterilizations-of-nativeamerican-women/ [https://perma.cc/YYP5-RCJR]; see also Brianna Theobald, A 1970
Law Led To The Mass Sterilization of Native American Women. That History Still Matters,
TIME (Nov. 27, 2019), https://time.com/5737080/native-american-sterilization-history/
(“Over the six-year period that had followed the passage of the Family Planning Services
and Population Research Act of 1970, physicians sterilized perhaps 25% of Native American women of childbearing age, and there is evidence suggesting that the numbers were
actually even higher.”).
331. See Kennedy, supra note 330.
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In each, racism is minimized or regarded as nonessential to the story of
caste in the United States. However, the profundity and enduring character of the racial caste system based on skin color in the United States suggests that even if religion served as an early galvanizing feature of colonial
and American social organization, race ideologies based on color trumped
those differences. Distinctions and discrimination based on religion gave
way to discrimination based on skin color and ethnic origins tied to Africa. 332
Caste in the United States gave way to the creation and preservation of social, political, and legal order based on skin color hundreds of
years ago to enduring effect. 333 Indeed, religion was retooled to support
and justify the enslavement of Black people. 334 In Christian Slavery: Conversion and Race in the Protestant Atlantic World, Katharine Gerbner writes,
“[t]he irony is dark and yet unambiguous: the most self-sacrificing, faithful, and zealous missionaries in the Atlantic world formulated and theorized a powerful and lasting religious ideology for a brutal system of plantation labor.” 335 Black people were no more able to climb out of the pits
of racial hierarchy through Christianity than they were by overcoming
the mathematics of hypodescent, which forever tethered one to the lowest racial caste for having “any negro blood in his veins of whatsoever
quantity.” 336
Eugenic practices in the United States further demonstrate racial
boundary policing inside of “whiteness,” but courts policed them from
the outside too, giving further evidence and weight to racial caste in the
United States. Legislatures and courts reserved whiteness, which conferred privileges and rights, only for people who appeared white. As the
Supreme Court declared in Ozawa v. United States in 1922,
The provision is not that Negroes and Indians shall
be excluded but it is, in effect, that only free white persons shall
be included. The intention was to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of persons whom the fathers knew as
337
white, and to deny it to all who could not be so classified.

332. See BAKER, supra note 289, at 513.
333. Adam Serwer, White Nationalism’s Deep American Roots, THE ATLANTIC (Apr.
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/04/adam-serwer-madisongrant-white-nationalism/583258/ [https://perma.cc/922M-33EG].
334. Gerbner, supra note 286, at 194 (“Protestantism was a stabilizing force that would
help to maintain, support, and reform slavery.”).
335. Id. at 196.
336. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 125, at 662.
337. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195 (1922) (emphasis added).
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In that case, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled a JapaneseAmerican man ineligible for citizenship because the legislature intended
naturalization in the United States only for “free white persons.” One
338
year later, in United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, the Justices unanimously affirmed that a person of Indian Sikh ethnicity did not fit the
“common sense” definition of “free white person,” despite being anthropologically Aryan and a former World War I Army veteran. 339
The Supreme Court left no room for doubt that the Naturalization
Act of 1906 intended to confer citizenship and whiteness only on people
who looked “white.” Justice Sutherland wrote the Court’s opinion, stating,
It may be true that the blond Scandinavian and the brown
Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that there are
unmistakable and profound differences between them today;
and it is not impossible, if that common ancestor could be materialized in the flesh, we should discover that he was himself
sufficiently differentiated from both of his descendants to preclude his racial classification with either.340
Whether America’s original caste story is one that roots in policing
religion or ethnic origins, the end result is a system galvanized around
contemporary understandings of race.
B. Racial Caste’s Operation in Law and Society
Various forms of violence emanating from racial caste ideology and
structure against Black people date back to the earliest trafficking of Black
people to the colonies and the emergence of states. 341 On the question of
whether a murder of an enslaved Black person was a criminal offense, a
typical legislative response explained that it was not:
[I]f any slave resists his master (or other by his master’s order
correcting him) and by the extremity of the correction should
chance to die, that his death shall not be accounted a felony,
but the master (or that other person appointed by the master
to punish him) be acquitted from molestation, since it cannot
338. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213-15 (1923) (denying citizenship to an Indian man who claimed that his Aryan lineage entitled him to the status of
a white man in the United States).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 209.
341. See State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263, 263 (1829).
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be presumed that premeditated malice (which alone makes
murder a felony) should induce any man to destroy his own
estate. 342
If racial caste creates the ordering of people, it also shapes social order
through privileging the favored and imposing conditions, constraints, and
disparate penalties on the disfavored to maintain the discriminatory structures set in place by law. 343 Historically, slave patrol police enforced social
order. Typically, slave patrol police possessed the power to “inflict corporal punishment” and the “power to seize any negro slave who behaves
insolently to a patroller” or “suspiciously.”344
Racial caste violence predates the founding of the United States and
continues through the public execution of George Floyd and the killing
of Breonna Taylor. As a historic matter, racial violence operated publicly 345 and privately, 346 economically, 347 physically 348 and psychologically,349
342. 11 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF
170, 260, 266, 270 (1809-23).
343. See State v. Mann, 13 N.C. at 263-64. In North Carolina, ordinances like the following were not uncommon:

ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA

1st. Patrols shall be appointed, at least four in each Captain’s district.
2d. It shall be their duty, for two of their number, at least, to patrol their
respective districts once in every week; in failure thereof, they shall be subject to the penalties prescribed by law.
3d. They shall have power to inflict corporal punishment, if two be present agreeing thereto.
4th. One patroller shall have power to seize any negro slave who behaves
insolently to a patroller, or otherwise unlawfully or suspiciously; and hold
such slave in custody until he can bring together a requisite number of Patrollers to act in the business.
5th. Previous to entering on their duties, Patrols shall call on some acting
magistrate, and take the following oath, to wit: “I, A. B. appointed one of
the Patrol by the County Court of Rowan, for Captain B’s company, do
hereby swear, that I will faithfully execute the duties of a Patroller, to the
best of my ability, according to law and the regulations of the County
Court.
See, e.g., Patrol Regulations for the County of Rowan, DOCUMENTING THE AM. SOUTH,
https://docsouth.unc.edu/nc/rowan/rowan.html [https://perma.cc/G8EM-YV8E] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
344. Patrol Regulations for the County of Rowan, supra note 343.
345. See, e.g., JAMES ALLEN, WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY IN
AMERICA (1999); WYN CRAIG WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE KU KLUX KLAN IN
AMERICA, 32-8 (1987).
346. Michael E. Miller, Cop Accused of Brutally Torturing Black Suspects Costs Chicago 5.5
Million, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/04/15/closing-the-book-on-jon-burge-chicago-cop-accused-of-brutallytorturing-african-american-suspects/ [https://perma.cc/K2GW-WJDQ].
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351

commercially, and sexually. For example, a North Carolina law, typical of others throughout the South, made it a crime for enslaved Black
people to read, write, or learn mathematics. It read:
Be it further enacted, That if any slave shall hereafter teach, or
attempt to teach, any other slave to read or write, the use of
figures excepted, he or she may be carried before any justice
of the peace, and on conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to
receive thirty nine lashes on his or her bare back.352
Arguably, public and private violence directed at Black people furthered states’ interests and prerogatives. At the very least, the threat of
unchecked violence against Black people served to limit their freedom,
autonomy, privacy, and equality—clear aims of lawmakers. One of the
more horrific ways of exercising public and private violence and unleashing terror was through lynching. 353 Lynchings became public spectacles,
and perversely public celebrations, where individuals posed for pictures,
brought snacks and picnics, and cut away flesh of lynched persons as
mementos.
Thus, there were other means of enforcing social order beyond the
use of slave patrol police. 354 Neither Black women nor children were

347. Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 505 (2001); Leah Douglas, African Americans Have Lost Untold
Acres of Land Over the Last Century, THE NATION (June 26, 2017), https://www.the
nation.com/article/archive/african-americans-have-lost-acres/ [https://perma.cc/GZT7SEM2].
348. All manners of exerting intellect for the benefits of oneself were punishable during
the Antebellum period, such as reading and writing. GEN. ASSEMB. OF THE STATE OF
N.C., Sess. 1830-31 (1831).
349. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY
OF RACIAL TERROR (2017).
350. In the United States, a potent means of manifesting white supremacy over Black
people has been through the use of hateful words, such as n**ger and caricatures depicting Black people in negative, stereotypic ways, such as with bulging eyes, large, exaggerated lips and other plays on physicality. One could easily characterize this as a form of
psychological violence so deeply normalized and engrained in the American psyche that
businesses adopted it as a model for their advertisement, thereby commercializing psychological violence. The lingering aspects of this exploit can be found in product packaging
of brands such as “Uncle Ben’s” rice, “Mrs. Butterworth’s” syrup, or “Aunt Jemima’s”
pancake mix. See M.M. MANRING, SLAVE IN A BOX: THE STRANGE CAREER OF AUNT
JEMIMA (1998).
351. See, e.g., MICHELE GOODWIN, POLICING THE WOMB (2020).
352. GEN. ASSEMB. OF THE STATE OF N.C., supra note 348, at 11.
353. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 349.
354. See, e.g., MELTON A. MCLAURIN, CELIA A SLAVE GIRL (1993).
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spared. Paula Giddings writes about Black women burned at the stake for
resisting enslavement. 355 Harriet Jacobs recounts in Incidents in the Life of a
Slave Girl that white women slaveholders inflicted cruelties as severely as
male slaveowners, enforcing whipping, brining, and pickling Black women to enforce order in their households and plantations.356
Lawmakers and courts sanctioned violence associated with racial
caste. In State v. Mann, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
whether shooting and wounding Lydia, a hired enslaved Black woman
whom the defendant did not own, but leased, was an actionable offense
and concluded it was not.357
Our laws uniformly treat the master or other person having
the possession and command of the slave, as entitled to the
same extent of authority. The object is the same—the services
of the slave; and the same powers must be confided. In a
criminal proceeding, and indeed in reference to all other persons but the general owner, the hirer and possessor of a slave,
in relation to both rights and duties, is, for the time being, the
owner.358
As one could not be liable for “battery upon his own slave, or other exercise of authority or force,” one could not be liable for shooting and
permanently injuring another’s. 359 Whether law protected the basic, human, and legal right for an enslaved person to defend herself was generally answered in the negative. In the case of Celia, Robert Newsom, the
man who enslaved her, repeatedly raped and beat her as a child starting at
age fourteen. 360 She retaliated at age nineteen and was put to death for it,
hanged after delivering a stillborn baby, likely the child of Newsom. 361
Caste-based racial violence inflicts not only physical punishment on
the individual but operates to inflict fear and psychological terror on entire communities to maintain social order. Lynchings in the United States
355. PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN
39–46 (1984).
356. See HARRIET JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL 59 (L. Maria Child
ed. Negro History Press) (1861).
357. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263, 263-65 (1829) (“Here the slave had been hired by the
Defendant, and was in his possession; and the battery was committed during the period of
hiring. With the liabilities of the hirer to the general owner, for an injury permanently
impairing the value of the slave, no rule now laid down is intended to interfere. That is
left upon the general doctrine of bailment. The enquiry here is, whether a cruel and unreasonable battery on a slave, by the hirer, is indictable.”).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. MCLAURIN, supra note 354, at 20-28.
361. See, e.g., MCLAURIN, supra note 354, at 103.
ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA
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achieved both. In Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of Jim Crow,
Leon Litwak describes how the execution spectacle of lynchings “witnessed by whites would be stamped on the character of the community
in a variety of ways.” 362 He reports that white children played games
whereby they lynched their Black dolls, and at least one case of a white
child, Jack McClay, who “play-lynched” his friend after witnessing an
actual lynching. 363 The little boy tied a rope around the friend’s neck and
secured the loose end to a nail on a nearby wall. 364 Fortunately, the nearly
lynched child survived.365 This game became known as “Salisbury.”366
Like Jack McClay, white children attended lynchings, “hoisted on
their parents’ shoulders to miss none of the action and accompanying festivities.” 367 White women also attended, participating in the entertainments that often accompanied the lynching of Black people. One news
account of a lynching attended by 3,000 white people in Rankin County, Mississippi in 1909 describes, “A few were nursing infants who tugged
at the mother’s breasts, while the mother kept her eyes on the gallows.
She didn’t want to lose any part of the program she had come miles to
see, and to tell to neighbors at home.”368
The case of Mary Turner exemplifies the tragedy and strategy of using violence as a means of controlling racial caste and enforcing racial order. 369 The case also speaks to the differing ideologies regarding sex and
womanhood across racial lines. Black women were subjected to unimaginable depravities. In Turner’s case, the act of publicly denouncing her
husband’s death by lynch mob and seeking criminal justice through law
enforcement, resulted in her horrific murder.370
Though she was pregnant, a white mob gathered on her and subsequently lynched Mary in retaliation for speaking out—essentially violating her caste status. According to a news report, a “mob of several hun-

362. LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM
CROW 288 (1998) [hereinafter TROUBLE IN MIND] (“Little separated mob lynchings from
public executions, neither the rapidity of the ‘justice’ rendered nor the festive mood that
often prevailed.”).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See Leon F. Litwack, Hellhounds, in WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING
PHOTOGRAPHY IN AMERICA 14 (James Allen ed., 2000).
370. Id.

WINTER 2021]

Law and Anti-Blackness

dred men and women determined to ‘teach her a lesson.’”
was eight months pregnant seemingly did not matter.
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That she

After tying her ankles together, they hung her from a tree,
head downward. Dousing her clothes with gasoline, they
burned them from her body. While she was still alive, someone used a knife ordinarily reserved for splitting hogs to cut
open the woman’s abdomen. The infant fell from her womb
to the ground and cried briefly, whereupon a member of this
Valdosta, Georgia, mob crushed the baby’s head beneath his
heel. Hundreds of bullets were then fired into Mary Turner’s
body, completing the work of the mob.372
Later, the Savannah Tribune would observe that the mob responded to
Turner’s “unwise remarks” about her husband’s misfortune. The people,
according to the article, “in their indignant mood, took exception to her
remarks, as well as her attitude.” 373
The horrors innovated through the racial caste system “often exceeded the most vivid imaginations.” 374 Institutionally, racial caste violence fortifies and flows from the privileged against the disfavored, much
like law, even while episodic instances of rebellion or attempts to strike
back also mark history. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. put it thusly, “[T]he
nation [has] come to count on [Black people] as a creature who could
quietly endure, silently suffer and patiently wait. He was well trained in
service and, whatever the provocation, he neither pushed back nor spoke
back.” 375
A 1919 column in the Nashville Banner—in opposition to federal
anti-lynching legislation—argued such a law “would overthrow a very
important prerogative reserved for the states, and would be a dangerous
encroachment on the right of local self-government—the principles of
federalism, the groundwork on which the Union is built.”376 Legislators
and governors were aligned in the view that lynchings constituted a
states’ rights issue. 377 Given that southern states (and northern ones too)

371. Walter F. White, The Work of a Mob, 16 THE CRISIS 215, 221-23 (1918); See also
Negro and Wife Lynched by Mob, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 20, 1918) (claiming Mary was a
conspirator in a plot to murder a white farmer).
372. TROUBLE IN MIND, supra note 362, at 288–89.
373. Lynching a Negro Woman for “Unwise” Remarks, SAVANNAH TRIB., May 25, 1918.
374. TROUBLE IN MIND, supra note 362, at 288–90.
375. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 2–3 (1963).
376. Claudine L. Ferrell, Nightmare and Dream: Antilynching in Congress, 1917-1922,
6–7 (May, 1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University) (on file with
ProQuest database).
377. Id.
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rarely prosecuted white perpetrators and accomplices for lynching Black
people, states essentially argued for their right to neither prosecute nor do
anything else to intervene against lynch mobs attacking Black people.378
Tennessee Governor Malcolm Patterson rallied against the
NAACP’s campaign for the enactment of federal anti-lynching law.379 He
stated, “no more impudent challenge . . . was ever thrown in the face of
a people or one more destructive to the rights of their states.” 380 Similarly,
Senator William Borah argued against anti-lynching legislation.381 He
claimed that anti-lynching legislation was unconstitutional and that it interfered with states’ rights. 382 According to Senator Borah, a vote for antilynching legislation was comparable to lynching itself.383
The racial caste system innovates means of maintaining order;
whipping, brining, lynching, and police violence represent a slice of what
Black people endured as a matter of law and order. The racial caste system also inflicts economic punishment, undermines property rights, and
even results in robbing people of their land.
Consider the following examples:
1. The Greenwood Massacre (Black Wall Street)
One of the nation’s most devastating terror attacks occurred in
1921, when a Black community in Tulsa, Oklahoma, known as “Black
Wall Street,” was pillaged by a rampaging white mob who burned the
community to the ground, murdering hundreds of Black people in the
process. 384 The area “recognized nationally for its affluent African American community, became known as the Greenwood District. The business
district and the surrounding Black community thrived with Black-owned
banks, furriers, movie theatres, schools, places of worship, and fraternity. 385
378. MARGARET VANDIVER, LETHAL PUNISHMENT: LYNCHINGS AND LEGAL
EXECUTIONS IN THE SOUTH 117 (2005).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, AFRICAN AMERICANS CONFRONT LYNCHING:
STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 75
(Jacqueline M. Moore & Nina Mjagkij eds., 2009).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Chris M. Messer & Patricia A. Bell, Mass Media and Governmental Framing of Riots:
The Case of Tulsa, 1921, 40 J. BLACK STUD. 851 (2010); Chris M. Messer, The Tulsa Race
Riot of 1921: Toward an Integrative Theory of Collective Violence, 44 J. SOC. HIST. 1217
(2011).
385. See, e.g., ALFRED BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA
RACE RIOT OF 1921, RACE REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION (Oxford Univ. Press
ed. 2002); 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre: The Attack on Greenwood, TULSA HIST. SOC’Y &
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Mob violence descended on Greenwood on May 31, 1921. By the
morning “sunrise on June 2, Greenwood lay in ruins: burned to the
ground by a mob of white people, aided and abetted by the National
Guard.” 386 It was the first time that bombs were dropped on an American
city. 387 According to the New York Times, it was “one of the worst acts of
racial violence in American history. The death toll may have been as high
as 300, with hundreds more injured and an estimated 8,000 or more left
homeless.” 388
However, in the immediate aftermath, the massacre was covered
up. Local officials “set about erasing it from the city’s historical record.”389
An unknown number of “[v]ictims were buried in unmarked graves.” 390
Like the disappearing of people, police records similarly “vanished.”391
Equally, articles published by the Tulsa Tribune “were cut out before the
newspapers were transferred to microfilm.”392 Local officials were so effective at scrubbing away the historical bloodstained aftermath of the
Tulsa massacre that by two decades later, students were doubtful that the
events ever took place.393
2. Rosewood Massacre
On New Year’s Day, 1923, Rosewood, a prominent Black settlement in Florida, was set upon by a mob of white residents from a nearby
town looking for a Black assailant who allegedly bruised a white woman. 394 This “small and prosperous predominantly black town, with its own
baseball team, a masonic temple and a few hundred residents” was un-

MUSEUM, https://www.tulsahistory.org/exhibit/1921-tulsa-race-massacre/ [https://perma.cc/
4G46-BG4R] (last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
386. Maggie Astor, What to Know About the Tulsa Greenwood Massacre, N.Y. TIMES (June
20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/20/us/tulsa-greenwood-massacre.html.
387. DeNeen L. Brown, ‘They Was Killing Black People’, WASH. POST (Sep. 28, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2018/09/28/feature/they-was-killingblack-people/ (“Tulsa was likely the first city” in the United States “to be bombed from
the air.”).
388. Astor, supra note 386.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. (“City officials cleansed the history books so thoroughly that when Nancy
Feldman, a lawyer from Illinois, started teaching her students at the University of Tulsa
about the massacre in the late 1940s, they didn’t believe her.”).
394. Jessica Glenza, Rosewood Massacre a Harrowing Tale of Racism and the Road Toward
Reparations, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2016/jan/03/rosewood-florida-massacre-racial-violence-reparations
[https://perma.cc
/G3SV-4T45].
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prepared for the horror that would soon be inflicted. According to local reports, “[a] crowd swelled in Sumner to find the ‘fugitive’, some
from as far away as Gainesville, where the same day the Ku Klux Klan
held a high-profile parade.” 396 In the ensuing days, “gangs of hundreds
delivered lynch mob justice to the once-affluent town of Rosewood.”397
Black people attempted escape. Morgan Carter recounts the stories
told by her great-grandfather, Oren Monroe, who was a child when his
family escaped. In Monroe’s case, he and his family escaped with a group
of children and women, “on an unusually cold night, wading through a
swamp before boarding a train that took them to a safer place.” 398 Again,
the violence was indiscriminate when inflicted on Black communities;
Black women were just as likely to be targeted as men and subjected to
the same degree of indignities and violence.399 It is unclear how many
Black people were murdered through white mob violence in Rosewood
or throughout their experience in the United States.
3. Eminent Domain: Seizing Bruce’s Beach
In 1912, a community along a prime section of the California coastline was purchased by Willa Bruce. 400 She and her husband Charles, a
railroad dining car chef, set out to establish their homestead. Willa built a
café, lodge, and dance hall. Other Black families invested in the area and
built hotel accommodations, a pier for boats, and restaurants. While today the property is known as the affluent Manhattan Beach in Southern
California, at the time it was “Bruce’s Beach.” 401 Black visitors traveled
from far and wide to experience Bruce’s Beach, enjoy the ocean, and relax.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Robert Samuels, After Reparations: How a Scholarship Helped — and Didn’t Help —
Descendants of Victims of the 1923 Rosewood Racial Massacre., WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/rosewood-reparations/.
399. Trevor Goodloe, Rosewood Massacre (1923), BLACKPAST (Mar. 23, 2008),
https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/rosewood-massacre-1923/
[https://perma.cc/TRV9-5M6T] (“On January 4, 1923, a group of twenty-to-thirty
white men approached the Carrier home and shot the family dog. When Sylvester’s
mother Sarah came to the porch to confront the mob, they shot and killed her.”).
400. Rosanna Xia, Manhattan Beach Was Once Home to Black Beachgoers, but the City Ran
Them Out. Now It Faces a Reckoning, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-08-02/bruces-beach-manhattan-beach;
LA Times Today Staff, The Legacy of Bruce’s Beach and the Racism That Shut It Down,
SPECTRUM NEWS (Sept. 25, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://spectrumnews1.com/ca/la-west/latimes-today/2020/09/25/the-legacy-of-bruce-s-beach-and-the-racism-that-shut-it-down
[https://perma.cc/4P9V-8YYN].
401. Xia, supra note 400.
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Given the restrictions placed on where Black people could sleep,
eat, play, recreate, stop for gas, and more in cities and states throughout
the United States, safe spaces, such as Bruce’s Beach, were an attraction.
This became a California safe haven for some Black people with the
means to enjoy it. Sunset laws in nearby California areas and threats of
violence if Black people were out after dark meant that visitors enjoyed
the security of the location without the need for further travel.
However, not unlike towns across the United States where Black
people established successful neighborhoods, white residents organized
and mobilized to push them out. 402 Their pier was burned down. The
Bruces rebuilt. Regularly, guests’ automobile tires were slashed. According to a Los Angeles Times report:
The Ku Klux Klan purportedly set fire to a mattress under the
main deck and torched a Black-owned home nearby. Fake
“10 minutes only” parking signs were posted to deter Black
out-of-town folk. To reach the ocean, visitors had to walk an
extra half mile around property owned by [George] Peck,
who had lined it with security and “No Trespassing” signs. 403
Threats of racial violence ensued. The Ku Klux Klan engaged in crossburning to further undermine the safety of the community and detract
people from visiting. When they were unable to successfully push Black
people off their ocean-front land, local white homeowners and business
leaders appealed to local lawmakers. 404 As discussed in Part III, white
people appealed to local authorities to create and maintain racial caste
through law.
In 1924, “city officials condemned the neighborhood,” seizing
more than two dozen properties through “eminent domain.” 405 Local officials claimed the city needed the property to build a public park. 406 The
Bruces and other families sued, “citing racial prejudice.” 407 The Bruces
sought fair market value, $120,000 in compensation, for their two beach
front lots, which is the amount required by law under imminent domain.
Instead, “after years of litigation, the Bruces received $14,500.” 408 Today,
the property they owned has an estimated value of $75 million dollars.409
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C. Reckoning, Reconciliation, and Post-Racial Mythology
How does the United States come to engage in its own truth and
conciliation regarding racial caste when the mythology of a post-racial
America deeply resonates? 410 The first step, which this Article seeks to do,
is to make evident the legal historical record so deeply buried. By excavating that record, the racial caste system and the laws that created it become visible. We can take stock.
Considering the legacies outlined in Parts I, II, and III of this Article, it is no surprise that a nation with such a grave history of racial violence and antagonism, spanning centuries and baked into law, wishes to
forget, disremember, or rewrite its troubling past. In fact, mere years after
the abolition of slavery, in the thick of states enacting racially restrictive
laws and limiting full equality, the Supreme Court claimed that Black
people were “running the slavery argument into the ground to make it
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to
make.” 411
In the wake of Barack Obama’s election, “‘post-racial’ . . . [became]
a powerful new buzzword in our social and political lexicon, and its
reach has had an enormous impact.”412 That is, “[b]y electing an African
American to be President, some politicians, judges, and media pundits
have asserted that America has now officially overcome racism and that
the work of the Civil Rights Movement is completed.” 413 This mythology pervaded during the Obama administration, even while the first and
only Black president in the United States and his family experienced harassment, threats, and caricaturing in American media.414
410. See, e.g., NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA? NOT
YET (2009), https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Post-Racial-America-NotYet_Political_Participation.pdf [https://perma.cc/EYW4-QWFZ]; See also Neil Gotanda,
A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993).
411. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
412. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 410, at 2.
413. Id.
414. See, e.g., Terence Samuel, The Racist Backlash Obama Has Faced During his Presidency, WASH. POST, (Apr. 22, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national
/obama-legacy/racial-backlash-against-the-president.html; see also Barry Blitt, Fistbump:
The Politics of Fear, NEW YORKER, July 21, 2008 (cover depicting Barack Obama in sandals and Muslim garb giving a fist-bump to Michelle Obama as she is in an afro, combat
boots, military fatigues and carrying and assault rifle on her back—they appear to be in
the White House); Kyle Smith, The Fat and the Furious, N.Y. POST: OPINION (May 16,
2010),
https://nypost.com/2010/05/16/politicians-want-to-tax-us-thin-but-its-biggovernment-that-needs-a-diet/ (illustration by Leah Tiscione depicting Michelle Obama
in a police uniform, with baton at her side, violently clenching the mouth of a white elementary-school aged boy, while his hamburger, soda, and condiments are flung into the
air); Sewell Chan & Jeremy W. Peters, Chimp-Stimulus Cartoon Raises Racism Concerns,
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According to a report issued by the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, “President Obama’s election mark[ed] continued progress toward our highest ideals of freedom and equality, affording all
Americans great hope about the promises of our Constitution. Yet, some
mistake this critical milestone as the end of our nation’s ongoing journey
toward racial equality.”415
Yet, the lingua of post-racial and presumably post-caste is centuries
old. The Supreme Court’s holding in the Civil Rights Cases argued that
the United States was legitimately “post-racial” as early as 1883. 416 The
Court stated that racial progress in the United States required that Black
people “shake off” the legacy of slavery and become “a mere citizen.” 417
Barely twenty years after the abolition of slavery, the Court declared it
was time that Black people cease being “the special favorite of the
laws.” 418
The Court warned that, if taken to extremes, Black people could
argue that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to matters involving discrimination related to being denied “coach or cab or car” service; refused
admittance to a “concert or theatre;” or rebuffed “in other matters of intercourse or business.” 419 The Court stated businesses were required to
provide services to “all unobjectionable persons.” 420 This explicitly affirmed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality principle was inapplicable to private actors who discriminated against Black people and implied it was reasonable for businesses to regard Black people with
suspicion and as ‘objectionable.’ Thus, rather than by accident, American
law references the indignities and traumas experienced by Black Americans as “mere,” 421 incidental, 422 non-important, 423 and non-lingering.424

N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2009) https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/chimpstimulus-cartoon-raises-racism-concerns/ (“Critics said the cartoon, drawn by Sean
Delonas, implicitly compared President Obama with the primate and evoked a history of
racist imagery of blacks.”).
415. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, supra note 410, at 2.
416. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24–26.
417. Id. at 25.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 24–25.
420. Id.
421. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896) (“A statute which implies
merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races—a distinction which is
founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white men
are distinguished from the other race by color—has no tendency to destroy the legal
equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.”); See also The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24 (querying, “Can the act of a mere individual, the
owner of the inn, the public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the appli-
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Sadly, the Court’s laissez-faire regard to the disenfranchisement and discrimination against Blacks perpetuated racial caste in the United States.
The post-racial mythology dangerously papers over American legal
history, specifically obscuring American law used in service of racial discrimination, coercion, and exploitation. The mythology suggests that the
laws and legal strategies discussed in Parts I through III were either harmless or its victims blameworthy of discrimination, or both, rather than
what they truly were: abhorrent and a mark of shame on our country.
Or, it suggests that discrimination is simply the scourge of life for Black
Americans, for which there are limited remedies before the nation’s
highest Court, unless plaintiffs show the “smoking gun” of intentional or
purposeful discrimination, providing the spent casings of race discrimination and powder residue of animus.
Sadly, this latter sentiment lingers in Supreme Court jurisprudence
from Dred Scott and Plessy through Palmer v. Thompson, 425 Arlington
Heights, 426 Washington v. Davis, 427 Mobile v. Bolden, 428 Memphis v. Greene,429
cant . . . ?” and answering in the negative, while leaving the matter to states that enacted
discriminatory laws).
422. See, e.g., Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (holding that excluding persons of color
from juries is sustainable).
423. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (upholding the death penalty
based on the premise that the Eighth Amendment is not violated when purposeful racial
discrimination cannot be proved despite evident disparate racial impact. In this case, the
Court not only ignored overwhelming empirical research related to race discrimination,
but it also effectively blessed judicial reliance on non-supported inferences over social science.).
424. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down a key provision in the Voting Rights Act based on the notion that it is an old and outdated formula,
ignoring evidence by the District Court that there is “compelling evidence that political
exclusion through racism remains a real and enduring problem”); id. at 584 (Ginsburg
dissenting).
425. 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (upholding the decision of Jackson, Mississippi officials
to close its swimming pools rather than desegregate them, holding that to do so does not
violate the spirit of either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments).
426. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp,, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (In a 5-3 decision, holding that the denial of a zoning request, necessary for the creation of low-and
moderate-income housing may have been racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish racially discriminatory intent or purpose).
427. 426 U.S. 229 (1978) (holding policies that have a racially discriminatory effect, but
that were not put in place to advance a racially discriminatory purpose are valid under the
U.S. Constitution in a case alleging race discrimination in police department hiring).
428. 446 U.S. 55, 56 (1980) (stating, “only if there is purposeful discrimination can
there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
429. 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (rejecting plaintiffs’ race discrimination claims that local authorities closed off Black people’s access to a local park—that had a history of segregation—for failure to show purposeful discrimination).
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and most recently, Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African American
Owned Media. 430 Even in matters involving the death penalty, including
McCleskey v. Kemp, 431 the Court has expressed disdain for claims of discrimination, and in that case, ultimately Black life. 432 By papering over
how the law undergirds racial caste in the United States, legislatures and
courts treat as moot intergenerational discrimination as well as physical
and psychological trauma experienced by Black Americans.
In 1968, in a lesser-known concurrence, Justice Douglas sums up
America’s racial case system:
Some badges of slavery remain today. While the institution
has been outlawed, it has remained in the minds and hearts of
many white men. Cases which have come to this Court depict
a spectacle of slavery unwilling to die. We have seen contrivances by States designed to thwart Negro voting . . . Negroes
have been excluded over and again from juries solely on account of their race . . . or have been forced to sit in segregated
seats in courtrooms . . . . They have been made to attend segregated and inferior schools . . . or been denied entrance to
colleges or graduate schools because of their color . . . have
been prosecuted for marrying whites . . . . They have been
forced to live in segregated residential districts and residents of
white neighborhoods have denied them entrance . . . Negroes
have been forced to use segregated facilities in going about
their daily lives, having been excluded from railway coaches;
public parks; restaurants; public beaches; golf courses; amusement parks; buses; public libraries. A state court judge in Alabama convicted a Negro woman of contempt of court because
she refused to answer him when he addressed her as “Mary,”
although she had made the simple request to be called “Miss
Hamilton.” 433

430. No. 18-1171 U.S. Reports 1 (2019) (providing that in cases involving allegations
of racial discrimination, plaintiffs must show in all matters of the litigation that race was
the “but for” cause of the injury).
431. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
432. In that 5-4 decision, McCleskey, a Black man convicted of murdering a police officer was sentenced to death. He provided statistical evidence that in Georgia the death
penalty correlated with the race of the victim and the accused such that Black people who
killed white people were statistically more likely to be put to death than white people
who killed African Americans. The Court ruled that because McCleskey did not prove
purposeful discrimination in his specific case, no constitutional violation could be established. Id.
433. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445-46 (1968) (Douglas, J. concurring).
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The racial caste system undermines physical and mental health,
criminal justice, constitutional equality, employment opportunity, access
to education, and the ability to live free without the prospect of unwarranted surveillance and invasion of privacy. By focusing on the racial
caste system, this Article contributes to a discourse begun more than a
century ago by Harriet Jacobs, Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglass, Ida
B. Wells, W.E.B. DuBois and continued by the prophetic works of Pauli
Murray and Paula Giddings, and more recently by Isabel Wilkerson.
Over the years, critical race scholars and others have unpacked the ways
in which racial constructions undermine equality and fasten the American
society to enduring social inequality. This Article endeavors to take seriously the challenge to reckon, reconcile, and redeem. Where this Article
falls short, the hope will be that others will further the discussion.
Conclusion
During the summer of 2020, streets in Minneapolis, Minnesota
burned after the videoed execution of an unarmed Black man, who died
underneath the weight of an officer’s knee on his neck. George Floyd
called to his mother, gasped that he could not breathe, and died. The
scene was the contemporary analog to James Allen’s Without Sanctuary,
which exposed lynchings from throughout the United States, captured by
20th century photographers and often memorialized in postcards.
On the day of Mr. Floyd’s death, anyone who witnessed even part
of the video received an unwelcome postcard in their “inbox.” It was a
powerful reminder of America’s racial caste system no longer depicted in
cotton fields but rather the urban streets of the United States. This postcard shows what is old—the racial caste system—is new and revitalized.
And, what is new reflects a history and performance that we have not
shaken. Officer Chauvin demonstrated the performance of the racial hierarchy in literal terms, high above and seemingly unmindful about the
value of life beneath his knee. He cared little for the equality of personhood that Senator Sumner argued for long ago at the debate about the
Thirteenth Amendment.
In a key study of slavery, John Blassingame shares how masters first
attempted to demonstrate their moral and intellectual superiority over
blacks:
Many masters tried first to demonstrate their own authority
over the slave and then the superiority of all whites over
blacks. They continually told the slave he was unfit for freedom, that every slave who attempted to escape was captured
and sold further South, and that the black man must conform
to the white man’s every wish. The penalties for non-
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conformity were severe; the lessons uniformly pointed to one
idea: the slave was [a] thing to be used by the “superior”
race. 434
Today, the endurance of racial caste cannot be maintained without
the structures and forces of law. Vertical, racial hierarchies reshaped laws,
and in so doing, reduced the impact of the Reconstruction Amendments
for more than a century. Sadly, laws rendered the Amendments virtually
meaningless by replacing equal protection with “separate but equal” and
voting rights with expanded, dubious requirements and restrictions. Even
the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery is punctuated by a Punishment Clause, which legalizes slavery in the United States so long as an
individual has been convicted of a crime. The Punishment Clause provided the foundation on which southerners committed to slavery could
and did expand coerced labor. It has yet to be repealed.

434. JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 257 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1972).
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